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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
One of the most interesting and important developments 
in the history of political economy was Adam Smith's (4 8) 
discovery that "ideal cooperation" results from each indi­
vidual's pursuing his own selfish good. As Smith's 
successors pointed out, however, the validity of this 
"invisible hand" doctrine requires the satisfaction of certain 
necessary conditions. These conditions can be expressed 
generally as the requirement that no discrepancies exist be­
tween social wants and private supplies of goods and ser­
vices. 
Monopoly 
Abstracting from distributional considerations, the 
term "ideal cooperation" can be viewed as being synonymous 
with "Pareto optimality.As is well known by economists, 
one cause of failure to achieve Pareto optimality is the 
existence of monopoly elements. Monopolistic firms maximize 
profits by producing at a level of output for which marginal 
social benefits (price) are greater than marginal social 
cost, so that social wants are greater than private supplies. 
^Pareto optimality is defined as a position from which 
it is impossible, by any reallocation of factors, to improve JLi. - 1 ^ _ T" . -* . • • .1 . . _ * ,4 . * • 
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any other individual. 
2 
Social Cost 
Even if the assumption is made, however, that every 
consumer, every firm, every industry, and every imput market 
is perfectly competitive, the possibility still remains for 
divergencies between social wants and private supplies. To 
illustrate this point, consider the case of pollution. Here, 
firms may be expected to produce at a level of output for 
which marginal social benefits are less than marginal social 
cost, with the result that social wants are less than private 
supplies. In other words, firms may produce more of a "good" 
(pollution) than individuals and society desire. 
Pollution is one example of a phenomenon which, like 
monopoly, leads to a divergence between social wants and 
private supplies. This phenomenon, as will be seen, is 
associated with the existence of other than fully appropriable 
private goods. That is, given the assumptions—in a statical 
framework—of perfect information, the proper convexities of 
tastes and technology, and the profit- and utility-maximizing 
behavior of decision-makers, perfect competition will produce 
Pareto optimality only if the requirement is met that all 
2 goods are fully appropriable private goods. 
2 The fundamental characteristic of private goods is that 
their consumption by one individual precludes the possibility 
of their cons imption, at the same time, by others. Appro-
priabiiity refers to.tne errective enforcement of property 
rights. 
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Divergencies between private and social net benefits 
caused by the existence of other than fully appropriable 
private goods are denoted by terms such as "social cost," 
"market failure," and "external economies and diseconomies." 
Unfortunately, these terms do not discriminate between the 
underlying causes of the divergencies. The purpose of this 
paper is to identify the causes of "social cost" and to 
distinguish carefully their allocative implications. 
Two causes of social cost 
Two fundamentally distinct phenomena representing de­
partures from the concept of appropriable private goods will 
be examined; "externalities" and "public goods." Externali­
ties are defined as cases of joint supply where all of the 
products are private goods but where one of the products is 
characterized by infeasibility of exclusion. Public goods 
are characterized by "jointness," where jointness exists 
whenever one individual's consumption of a unit of a good 
does not preclude the possibility of others' being able 
simultaneously to consume that same unit. 
Externalities Externalities are shown to exist when­
ever a good with a nonzero shadow value does not receive its 
correct price because of the infeasibility of excluding those 
wHn not ; " SOCÎbI IP th® rif ovt-<a"rn?i l l •)-i «aç; i s 
caused by institutional inadequacies, or more specifically, by 
4 
the inability to enforce property rights. The point will 
be emphasized that externalities, unlike public goods, are 
not characterized by jointness. The inefficiencies asso­
ciated with the existence of externalities generally can be 
eliminated through rearrangements of ownership, i.e., through 
"internalization." 
Public goods The failure of competitive markets to 
achieve Pareto optimality in the provision of public goods 
is due to individuals lack of incentive to reveal their true 
preference for goods characterized by jointness. This lack 
of incentive is owing to consumers' recognition that the 
possibility exists of consuming units of a public good 
provided by others.^ That is, public goods, unlike private 
goods, may be consumed simultaneously by two or more indivi­
duals. Efficiency in the case of public goods is a far more 
elusive goal than in the case of externalities. As will be 
seen, neither market nor nonmarket means generally can be 
relied upon to produce Pareto optimality in the provision of 
public goods. 
In addition to "conventional" public goods, special 
consideration will be given to cases in which public goods 
are supplied jointly with one or more private goods. These 
^T*n mf ov+Arnal i 4-4 OG . 4-r'no wi 1 1 
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be revealed because jointness is lacking, i.e., externalities 
are a private good phenomenon. 
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cases will be labeled "merit goods." The basis for a 
separate and detailed examination of merit goods is that 
this concept encompasses many real world phenomena—e.g., 
air and water pollution, education, and health care—that 
often are viewed mistakenly as involving "externalities." 
Summary 
In view of the fundamentally distinct allocative 
problems presented by the existence of externalities and 
public goods, and recognizing that the two cases may not call 
for the same "solutions," the two phenomena should not be 
lumped together under one nondescript term. Unfortunately, 
much confusion exists because this is exactly what has been 
done. By distinguishing carefully between the characteristics 
of externalities and public goods, it is hoped that the follow­
ing analysis will eliminate some of this confusion. 
6 
CHAPTER II. PROBLEMS OF SOCIAL COST 
One of the central theorems of modern welfare economics 
states that under certain assumptions about technology, tastes, 
and the motivations of decision-makers, the equilibrium con­
ditions of a system of competitive markets correspond exactly 
to the requirements for Pareto optimality (23, p. 49).^ The 
correspondence between competitive equilibrium and Pareto 
optimality is valid, however, only if all the effects of one 
economic unit's choices on the well-being of other economic 
units are transmitted accurately through prices and costs. 
This will occur only in a private goods economy characterized 
by universally enforceable property rights. When these 
requirements are not met, divergencies can exist between 
private and social costs and/or benefits. Such divergencies 
are described variously as market failure, external economies 
and diseconomies, externalities, and social cost (2, 11, 
3, 15). What is generally ignored is that, except in certain 
special cases, situations involving social cost are character­
ized by the public good phenomenon. Failure to recognize the 
public good aspect of social cost can lead to confusion and 
misguided prescriptions for allocative efficiency. 
^The existence of firms with technology characterized 
by increasing returns to scale is not consistent with com­
petitive equilibrium. 
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The Two Party Case 
Generalizations based on a special case at best may cause 
misunderstanding and at worst may simply be wrong. Un­
fortunately, this problem has occurred in economists' treat­
ment of social cost. Most of the contributions to this area 
of economic theory have dealt explicitly with cases in which 
the activities of an economic unit affect only one external 
party, i.e., "two party" cases. A prime example is 
Coase's "The Problem of Social Cost" (15), an article 
which, although not known widely, has earned the respect of 
those to whom it is familiar. Coase dealt exclusively 
"with those actions of business firms which have harmful 
effects on others" (15, p. 1). To be more accurate, his 
analysis was limited to cases in which the actions of busi­
ness firms harm only one other firm. As will be shown, 
the analysis of this special case yields results that do not 
hold, in general, once the two party assumption is relaxed. 
Let A be a firm whose activity causes harm to B, and 
since B can consist of more than one firm and/or individual, 
let n represent the total number of externally harmed parties. 
For the special case where n=l, Coase was quite correct in 
his conclusion that Pareto optimality can be achieved either 
8 
2 by coercing A to compensate B for his losses, or by free 
negotiations between A and B. This can be illustrated with 
Figure 2.1, where the assumption is made that A's marginal 
gains and B's marginal losses are continuously variable.^ 





Scale of A's Activity 
Figure 2.1. Two party case 
2 Although this analysis is presented in terms of A's 
activities that harm B, the same conclusions would apply to 
cases where A's activities benefit B. 
3 
If A and B are firms, gain and loss can be measured in 
money terms as profit differences. If A and B are individuals, 
their gain or loss could be measured either as the amount of 
money they would pay, respectively, to undertake and to pre­
vent A's activity, or as the amount of money they would re­
quire, respectively, to curtail or to endure A's activity. 
These two amounts will not be the same, however, unless 
marginal utility of income is constant; therefore, the assump­
tion of constant marginal utility of income for all indivi­
duals will be made throughout this analysis. 
9 
If, for some reason, A and B are not free to negotiate, 
and if A is not held liable for damages to B, then A obvious­
ly will produce output OP, thereby maximizing his private 
gain. Pareto optimality, however, requires the maximization 
of joint net gain—A's gain less B's loss—and this occurs 
at output OE. B would be willing to pay up to (III + IV) to 
secure output OE rather than OP, whereas A would 6e willing 
to accept a minimum of (III) to reduce output from OP to OE. 
Positive gains from trade will accompany a reduction of A's 
activity level from OP to OE, and if A and B are free to 
negotiate, their bargaining will produce the Pareto-optimal 
outcome. The distribution of gains from trade between A and 
B will depend on their relative bargaining abilities. 
If a tax is levied against A to compensate B for damages,^ 
A's net gain will be maximized at activity level OE, where he 
will pay (II) to B, and retain (I) Although the Pareto-opti-
4 The attainment of Pareto optimality through compensa­
tion requires in all cases—not only when n=l—that the losses 
of the harmed parties can be determined without error. The 
harmed parties, however, will have a strong incentive to over­
state the amount of damage they suffer in the hope of securing 
greater compensation. An external observer may be able to 
assess accurately the amount of damage if the harmed parties 
are all firms, but if individuals are also affected this 
task becomes much more difficult, if not impossible. 
^Plott (35) has stressed the importance of placing the tax 
on the activity that actually causes the damage. Assume firm A 
employs a smoke-creating burning process in the manufacture of 
product X, and that the possibility exists for the firm to al-
process. Then a tax on the production of X rather than 
specifically on the burning activity may actually result in 
an increase in smoke production. 
10 
output, OE, may be attained either through compensation or 
free negotiations,^ the two approaches can produce very 
different distributional results. Under compensation, B will 
receive (II), whereas in the absence of compensation B would 
7 be willing to pay up to (III + IV) to secure output OE. 
The choice of whether or not to make A legally liable for 
damage inflicted on B must be based, therefore, on considera­
tions of equity rather than efficiency. In other words, 
in the special case where n=l, the "problem of social cost" 
is not a problem of allocation but of distribution. 
Compensation may, in some instances fail to achieve 
Pareto optimality by preventing the transfer of resources 
from inefficient uses. This possibility can be illustrated 
with a simple example. Assume that firm A's activity damages 
the crop's grown on a farm firm B, and that A is liable to 
compensate B for his crop loss. Suppose that in the absence 
of any production by firm A, firm B would have a net income 
of $2, derived from crop sales of $12 and expenses of $10. 
Suppose, further, that firm A's private profit maximizing 
output causes $3 of crop loss to firm B. When A maximizes 
profits, therefore, B will still earn annual net income of 
$2, although his revenue will now consist of $3 compensation 
from A and $9 in crop sales. Clearly, this is an inefficient 
outcome. A's costs could be reduced if B would discontinue 
crop production for any annual payment of less than $3, 
while B would be willing to retire the land for any payment 
in excess of $2, his foregone net income. The possibility 
exists, therefore, for a mutually satisfactory bargain which 
would entail B*s discontinuing crop production. If A is 
forced to compensate B for crop losses, the optimal solution 
will be prevented. 
^B's private optimum, of course, would require the dis­
continuation of A*s activity, and B would be willing to pay 
up to (II + III + IV) to secure this result. 
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Cases Involving Jointness 
Although market failure—in an allocative sense—does 
not occur in the "two party" case, to assume that the same 
conclusion holds, generally, in cases of social cost in­
volving more than one affected party would be not only 
heroic, but wrong. The reason, as will be seen, is that 
when the two party assumption is dropped, elements of the 
public good phenomenon appear. 
Assume, now, that A's activity harms two or more parties, 
so that B is comprised of n>l parties (firms and/or indi­
viduals). Returning to Figure 2.1, the curve of A's marginal 
gain retains the same interpretation as in the two party case. 
The curve of B's marginal loss will now be defined as the 
vertical summation of all the harmed parties' marginal loss 
curves, since the damage produced by each increment of A's 
activity is consumed simultaneously by all the externally 
affected parties. 
Pareto optimality, as in the "two party" case, is achieved 
at OE, and A's private optimum is at OP. A reduction in the 
scale of A's activity from OP to OE will benefit all the 
harmed parties simultaneously. The "reduction of harm" 
accompanying such a cutback is characterized, therefore, by 
jointness, where jointness is defined as that physical quality 
of a good which allows its "consumption" by one firm or 
12 
individual to cause no reduction in the amount consumed, 
at the same time, by others. Finally, the "reduction of harm" 
is a form of public good, since for a good to be defined as 
g 
"public" requires only that it be characterized by jointness. 
Two externally affected parties 
Consideration first will be given to the possibility of 
achieving Pareto optimality in cases involving two externally 
affected parties. In Figure 2.2 the curve "B's summed marginal 
loss" is derived by adding vertically the marginal loss 
curves of the two externally affected parties, and B2. The 
assumption is made that B^ and B^ are harmed identically by 
A's activity, so the curve "B^'s marginal loss" coincides 
with the curve "B^'s marginal loss". 
In the absence of either compensation or negotiation 
between A and the harmed parties, B, the scale of A's activity 
will be OP in Figure 2.2. A movement from OP toward the 
Pareto optimal output, OE, benefits the externally affected 
parties by reducing the amount of harm they suffer. For 
movements from right to left along the axis of Figure 2.2, 
therefore, the curve "B's marginal loss" can be viewed, 
instead, as the curve of B's marginal gain. Similarly, the 
curve "A's marginal gain" can be viewed, from the standpoint 
g 
The definition of public goods will be examined in 
greater detail in Chapter IV. 
13a 
$ 





Scale of A's activity 
Figure 2.2. Three party case 
13b 
of the harmed parties, as the marginal cost curve for reduc­
tions in harm, e.g., as the marginal cost of reduced air or 
water pollution. That is to say, in moving from right to left 
along the axis of Figure 2.2, the curve of A's marginal 
gain represents the minimum marginal payments required to 
"bribe" A to reduce its activity level. 
Suppose that B^, acting alone, enters into negotiations 
with firm A to effect a reduction in the level of A's activity 
from OP. Acting alone, will be able to secure a reduction 
of output to OM. To the left of M, the minimum amount re­
quired by A to further reduce output is greater than B^'s 
associated reduction of loss. B^, acting independently, will 
"supply" PM units of "reduced harm", which then will be 
9 
available not only to B^, but also to B^. B^ would be able 
to supply additional units of "reduced harm" if he were to 
receive, for each incremental unit to the left of M, a sub­
sidy at least as great as the difference between his marginal 
loss curve and A's marginal gain curve. A supply curve can 
be drawn representing the minimum amounts B^ would require to 
"produce" more than PM units of "reduced harm". This 
supply curve, MN, is derived as the difference between A's 
marginal gain curve and B^'s marginal loss curve. 
For the range of "reduced harm" between M and E, Bg's 
marginal losses are greater than B^'s locus of marginal 
9 The roles of B^ and B_ could be reversed without 
altering the outcome. 
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supply prices, so trade may develop between the two parties. 
Trading equilibrium occurs at output OE of reduced harm, 
where Bg's marginal loss curve intersects B^'s supply curve, 
MN. Output PE of "reduced harm" is identical to A's activity 
level OE, so the point of trading equilibrium is Pareto-
optimal. The point should be emphasized, however, that there 
exists no assurance that the two parties will reach the 
optimal point through free negotiations. In "small group" 
situations such as this the individuals are apt to behave 
strategically; that is, to bargain in an attempt to secure 
for themselves differentially favorable terms. The presence 
of jointness, even in small group situations, very sub­
stantially reduces the likelihood of a Pareto-optimal outcome. 
More than two externally affected parties 
As the number of externally affected parties is increased 
to three and beyond, the likelihood of achieving Pareto 
optimality through either market or nonmarket means diminishes 
If is an individual rather than a firm, he will 
enter into trade only if his utility is increased by doing so. 
Roberts (36) has pointed out that whether or not B2's utility 
will be increased through trading with B^ for additional "re­
duced harm" cannot be determined a priori. This is a question 
that can be answered only on the basis of knowledge of the 
shape of individual B2's utility surface for income and "re­
duced harm". By entering into trade, B2 will increase his 
consumption of "reduced harm", but reduce his money-holdings. 
Without knowing the shape of the relevant indifference 
curves, an ex ante determination of whether this will increase 
or decrease? hîc utility is impccciblc. 
15 
rapidly. When the number of harmed parties is large, indi­
vidual members of the group, recognizing the jointness 
characteristic of "reduced harm", rationally will understate 
their true marginal evaluations for "reduced harm" in the 
hope that they will be able to secure the benefits of the 
public good without contributing toward its cost (the 
amount necessary to bribe A to curtail the scale of his 
activity). Each harmed party will find it rational to be­
have in this manner even though the composite result of such 
individual and independent action will be nonoptimal for all 
members of the group. This is the "free-rider" problem, 
and it prevents the attainment of Pareto optimality in the 
provision of public goods by voluntary financing. 
The possibility may exist of excluding from the benefits 
of "reduced harm" all those who do not contribute toward 
its provision. This will not assure Pareto optimality, 
however, because no means exists by which an external ob­
server could determine accurately whether or not each harmed 
party contributes in accordance with his marginal evaluation. 
Compounding this problem is the fact that each harmed party 
will have an incentive to understate deliberately his true 
marginal evaluation. The relationship of exclusion to 
public goods is considered further in Chapter IV. 
Nonmarket approaches also will fail, in general, to 
produce Pareto optimality in the large number case. A 
16 
suggestion might be made, for example, to form a collective 
decision-making unit of all the externally affected parties. 
Collective decisions could then be made through some voting 
rule, with individual citizen-taxpayers bound by group deci­
sions. The funds necessary to secure a reduction of firm 
A's activity to the level OE could be acquired through 
taxation. Any voting rule short of unanimity, however, leaves 
open the possibility of an allocation of tax shares that is 
highly unfavorable to parties outside the winning coali­
tion. That is to say, the only voting rule which assures 
that no taxpayer suffers a net loss of utility as a result 
of a group decision is one which allows every taxpayer the 
power of veto over each tax sharing proposal put before the 
11 group. 
A second nonmarket approach would be to coerce firm A, 
through a collective decision, to compensate the externally 
harmed parties. The attainment of Pareto optimality by 
this means would require an accurate evaluation of the damage 
suffered by the harmed parties. Such an evaluation will be 
very difficult, if not impossible, especially if the harmed 
group includes individuals along with firms. 
In moving from cases of divergence between private and 
social cost-benefit calculations involving one externally 
^^This assumes the absence of side payments. 
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has led to a theory of public goods and jointness. That is, 
the failure of competitive market equilibrium to produce 
Pareto optimality in the situations examined thus far is due 
to the problems associated with jointness. This is not to 
imply, however, that all situations in which competitive 
equilibrium fails to produce Pareto optimality are due to the 
existence of jointness. 
Market Failure and Private Goods 
Competitive equilibrium may fail to produce Pareto 
optimality even in an economy characterized by a total lack 
of jointness and, therefore, public goods. "Market failure" 
in such cases is due to the existence of externalities. 
Externalities are defined as cases of Marshallian 
12 joint supply (25, p. 388) where all of the products are 
private goods, but at least one of the products is character­
ized by infeasibility of exclusion.Externalities will be 
produced in the long run only if at some level of output of 
12 Marshallian joint supply, as distinguished from 
jointness, exists when a single production unit (sheep) 
supplies two or more products (wool and mutton). Marshallian 
joint supply involves vertical summation of market demand 
curves for products, whereas jointness involves the vertical 
summation of individual demand curves. This distinction is 
discussed further in Chapter V. 
^^Externalities are examined in somewhat greater 
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the production unit the price(s) of the jointly supplied 
marketable products are equal to or greater than average 
cost. 
Externalities are inconsistent with Pareto optimality 
because private goods with non-zero shadow values do not 
receive their correct price. This occurs because institu­
tional arrangements fail to exclude from the consumption of 
such goods those parties who do not pay the correct shadow 
price. Take, for example, the case of the jointly supplied 
private goods, apple and nectar. Nectar has a positive shadow 
price since it is an input in honey production. The orchard 
owner, however, may find it impossible to determine accurately 
the amounts of nectar gathered by the bees of various honey 
producers. The beekeepers, themselves, may have no way of 
determining where the nectar is gathered. If exclusion is not 
feasible, the ratio of inputs employed in honey production 
will not be Pareto optimal. 
Increasing the number of potential consumers of a 
jointly supplied private good characterized by infeasibility 
of exclusion does not introduce jointness. Nectar is a 
purely private good regardless of the number of potential 
consumers. That is, more nectar for one beekeeper necessarily 
means less nectar for another beekeeper. Externalities cause 
14 
The absence of Pareto optimality in the apple-nectar-
honey example is demonstrated mathematically in Chapter III. 
19 
market failure because of infeasibility of exclusion, not 
because of jointness. Exclusion, if it were feasible, 
would eliminate market failure in the case of externalities, 
while neither exclusion nor any other institutional arrange­
ment can guarantee Pareto optimality in cases of jointness 
(public goods). 
Summary 
A system in competitive equilibrium may fail to satisfy 
the requirements for Pareto optimality because of the 
existence of jointness (public goods) and/or jointly supplied 
private goods characterized by infeasibility of exclusion 
(externalities). These two problems were distinguished 
in F. M. Bator's "The Anatomy of Market Failure" (2).^^ 
Bator, in what may have been an unfortunate choice of term­
inology^ called situations characterized by jointness "public 
goods externalities", and situations involving jointly 
supplied private goods characterized by infeasibility of ex­
clusion "ownership externalities." The indiscriminate use of 
the term "externality", may be somewhat dangerous, because 
^^Bator distinguished a third category of "market failure" 
which he labeled "technical externalities." This type in­
volves the existence of firms whose technology is such as to 
render the set of feasible production points nonconvex. In 
other words, "technical externalities" is synonomous with 
"increasing returns to scale" or "decreasing cost firms". 
Since nonconvexity of production sets is inconsistent with 
competitive equilibrium—although not with Pareto opti­
mality—this problem is not considered in this analysis. 
20 
the impression may be created that Pareto optimality can be 
achieved in all such cases by "internalization", i.e., by 
merger or some other institutional arrangement. As has been 
suggested, no such ready-made solution exists in solutions 
characterized by jointness. 
21 
CHAPTER III. EXTERNALITIES 
Externalities already have been defined as cases of 
Marshallian (25, p. 388) joint supply where all the products 
are private goods, but where at least one of the products is 
characterized by infeasibility of exclusion. This definition 
permits a clear distinction to be drawn between cases in which 
the failure of competitive market outcomes to be Pareto 
optimal is due to the existence of public goods (jointness), 
and cases in which the failure is related exclusively to 
private goods (externalities). This is an important distinc­
tion because the possibilities of attaining Pareto optimality 
are quite different in the two cases. For example, ineffi­
ciencies caused by externalities may be eliminated through 
improved modes of exclusion, whereas even the most highly 
refined techniques of exclusion cannot fully eliminate in­
efficiencies associated with jointness. 
Externalities and Pareto Optimality 
Externalities, as defined above, can be illustrated with 
a simple example involving the production of applies, nectar, 
and honey, all of which are private goods. The following 
assumptions will be made: apple trees produce apples (A) and 
nectar (N) in a fixed ratio; the production of apples and 
nectar requires only a single input, labor (L); and honey (H) 
production requires both labor and nectar. Pareto optimality 
22 
requires that 
'3-l> Ê + ''N Ê = " 
(3.2) 
"•3) a# = 
where P^, P^, P^, and w are the prices of apples, honey, 
nectar, and the wage rate, respectively. An externality 
exists if the assumption is made that the orchard owner is 
unable, because of infeasibility of exclusion, to enforce 
payment for his nectar. If the orchard owner receives no 
payment for the nectar (Pj^=0) , Equation 3.3 will not be 
satisfied—assuming the price of honey (P^) to be positive. 
Furthermore, the amount of labor employed in orcharding will 
be less than Pareto-optimal since the private VMP of 
orchard labor (P^ is less than its social VMP (P^ ^  
To reiterate, the failure of competitive markets to 
achieve Pareto optimality in situations involving external­
ities is due to a failure of institutional arrangements. The 
difficulty does not reside in the presence of jointness, since 
the "unpaid factor," nectar, is explicitly assumed to be a 
private good. If payment for the unpaid factor could be 
enforced, the externality would be eliminated. 
23 
Other "Externalities" 
The term "externality", as it is defined above, 
applies uniquely to cases in which the nonexclusion charac­
teristic of a jointly supplied private good causes competitive 
equilibrium not to be Pareto optimal; i.e., causes "market 
failure". Unfortunately, the term "externality" is also 
employed in describing not only situations which do not 
involved "market failure", but situations in which "market 
failure" may be due to jointness (public goods). Two such 
uses of the externality notation will be examined: "pecuniary 
externalities" and "technological externalities." The 
"pecuniary externality" concept bears no relationship to 
externalities as defined above, whereas the "technological 
externality" concept includes both situations characterized 
by externalities and situations characterized by jointness. 
Pecuniary externalities 
Pecuniary external diseconomies are created when an 
expansion of the output of a competitive industry causes an 
increase in the price of one or more of the inputs employed 
by firms in the industry. Pecuniary external economies 
are created when an expansion of the output of a competitive 
industry causes a decrease in the price of one or more of 
the inputs employed by firms in the industry. In other words, 
pecuniary external diseconomies are one cause of the positive 
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slope of the long run supply curves of competitive increasing 
cost industries, while pecuniary external economies are 
one cause of the negative slope of the long run 
supply curves of competitive decreasing cost industries. 
The point to be made is that pecuniary externalities, by them­
selves, cause no departure from Pareto optimality. 
/ 
Marshall (25) and Pigou (34) , however, were convinced 
that increasing cost industries represent a less desirable 
application of economic resources than do decreasing cost 
industries. They argued that the equilibrium output of 
increasing cost industries is greater than required for 
Pareto optimality, and that a tax should be levied against 
such industries to bring about the "correct" output. Con­
versely, it was argued that decreasing cost industries 
require a subsidy for the attainment of the Pareto optimal 
output. Both arguments involve fallacious reasoning, and 
since the two cases are not strictly symmetrical, they will 
be considered separately. 
Pecuniary external diseconomies Pigou argued that 
competitive increasing cost industry output as determined 
by the intersection of industry demand and supply curves is 
greater than Pareto optimal because the upward sloping 
industry supply curve does not account for increases in the 
price of inframarginal units of factors employed in the 
industry. In other words, the industry supply curve repre­
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sents the increasing cost of marginal input units employed 
in producing successive increments of output, whereas 
Pigou asserted that the "correct" supply curve for determining 
socially optimal industry output should represent the 
marginal cost of output including the increased value of all 
inframarginal, as well as marginal, input units. Pigou 
chose to call this "a curve of marginal supply prices" 
(34, pp. 172-179). 
In arguing that ideal industry output is determined by 
the intersection of demand and marginal supply price curves, 
Pigou erred in failing to recognize that the price increases 
accruing to inframarginal input units as industry output 
expands are producer's rents, and not, therefore, a true 
social cost. That is, the marginal social (opportunity) 
cost of employing resources yielding n units of output is 
merely the cost of resources required for the n^^ unit. This 
cost is expressed by the industry supply curve, not by the 
curve of marginal supply prices. The latter curve is not a 
social cost curve because it includes increments to rent. 
Therefore, the assertion that competitive increasing cost 
industries produce a greater than Pareto optimal level of 
output because they generate pecuniary externalities is 
inaccurate. Although Allyn Young (53) was the first to point 
this out, he was not successful in articulating the specific 
nature of the error. The ensuing debate was finally resolved 
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by Ellis and Fellner (19), who drew heavily from the work 
of Robertson (37), Sraffa (49) , Robinson (38), and Knight (22). 
Pecuniary external economies The existence of 
pecuniary external economies necessarily implies, as well, 
the existence of internal economies; i.e., the existence of 
firms with negatively sloping long run average cost curves. 
The existence of pecuniary external diseconomies is incon­
sistent, therefore, with competitive equilibrium. If, as 
is likely to occur in the absence of collective action, single 
firms are able fully to exploit internal economies, then 
the basis for pecuniary external economies is eliminated 
and a monopoly problem is created. Ignoring this possibility, 
however, as long as inputs produced under conditions of in­
creasing returns are sold at their declining marginal cost 
price, there will be no divergence from the conditions for 
Pareto optimality. 
Technological externalities^ 
A second broad category of "externalities" are the so-
called "technological externalities." Technological exter­
nalities, unlike pecuniary externalities, do not lead, 
generally, to Pareto optimal competitive market outcomes. 
The term "technological externality" can apply both to those 
^The fundamental distinction between "pecuniary ex-
•L- ^ — ji— — ^ ^ II —. ^ n ^ —w. — — — n A ——jL- A —, — — n J j ^ « ll ^ L.d.i.iCLa.x ciJ-i-va uc iia.a.x c.u.c::o r, cia 
made clear in Viner's "Cost Curves and Supply Curves" (51). 
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cases in which market failure is due to the existence of 
jointly supplied private goods characterized by infeasibility 
of exclusion (externality), and to cases in which market 
2 failure is due to the existence of jointness (public goods). 
The lumping together of these two fundamentally different 
phenomena is undesirable because, as has already been pointed 
out, they represent quite different problems with respect to 
the attainment of Pareto optimality. 
Technological externalities require that 
(3.4) f® = f®(X^,X2,...,X^,Y^), 
g 
where f can be viewed either as a utility function or 
production function of some economic unit B; 
are activities under B's control; and is under the 
control of some other economic unit, A. can represent 
either a consumption or production activity of unit A. 
A technological external economy exists when 
<3-. Ig. o ,  
which means that increases in the scale of y^ cause upward 
shifts of the utility or production function of unit B. 
A technological external diseconomy exists when 
2  ^  ^  J  ^ 1  —  —  1  _  J  —  —  J - —  J —  "  J -  ~  — 1 -  —  —  ^  —  — -  —  — T  ~  • ;  '  • -  -  "  
^ C..L. f L-ilC ill wax. CJVUCX iiaxx UJl' 
also encompasses the "two party case" which, as was shown in 
Chapter II, does not involve a failure of competitive markets 
to achieve Pareto optimality. 
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SfB 
(3.6) ^< 0, 
3yi 
which means that increases in the scale of cause down-
3 
ward shifts of B's utility or production function. 
If y^^ involves the production of a public good, e.g., 
national defense or water quality, then "market failure" is 
caused by jointness. If, on the other hand, y^ involves the 
production of a private good characterized by nonexclusion, 
e.g., nectar, then "market failure" is the result of ex­
ternality. 
Although many systems have been devised for classifying 
various types of technological externalities (13, p. 58), 
they generally do not point out the fundamental distinction 
between cases characterized by the infeasibility of exclusion 
of a jointly supplied private good (externality), and cases 
characterized by jointness. Two notable exceptions, 
however, are Bator's "The Anatomy of Market Failure" (2), 
which has already been discussed, and Meade's "External 
Economies and Diseconomies in a Competitive Situation" 
(28). Bator explicitly differentiated between externality 
and jointness as causes of "market failure," whereas Meade's 
use of examples implied a recognition of these two fundamental 
cases. 
In referring tc shifts in B's utility or production func­
tion caused by changes in the scale of y,, the implication is 
that the axes of the utility or production surface represent 
only those activities under B's control. 
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Meade discussed two types of technological externality: 
"unpaid factors of production," and "creation of atmosphere." 
The "unpaid factor" case, which he illustrated using the 
apple-nectar-honey production example, corresponds to the 
case defined above as "externality." 
Meade went on, however, to draw what he viewed as an 
important distinction between a "factor of production" and 
a "physical or social atmosphere" as elements affecting the 
output of a firm or industry. In contrast to a "factor of 
production", a unit of "atmosphere" is defined to be avail­
able simultaneously to more than one producer. Meade based 
his second category of externality, "creation of atmosphere", 
on the premise that "the activities of one group of producers 
may provide an atmosphere which is favorable or unfavorable 
to the activities of another group of producers" (28, p. 
62). As an example of "atmosphere externalities" he con­
structed a situation in which the afforestation of an area 
to the leeward of a wheat producing region causes an increase 
in the availability of rainfall for the wheat growers. 
"Atmosphere", as defined by Meade, seems clearly to in­
volve the production of a public good. In his example, the 
lumber industry can be viewed as supplying a public good— 
"conditions favorable to the creation of rainfall"—which 
benefits all wheat growers within a particular region. Even 
if exclusion of those wheat growers refusing to pay for the 
"conditions favorable to the creation of ranfall" were possible. 
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Pareto optimality probably would not be achieved owing to the 
existence of jointness. 
The "creation of atmosphere" category of technological 
externalities developed by Meade represented a significant 
departure from the general trend of social cost literature 
in that it explicitly moved away from the "two party" case 
which/ as has been shown, involves no allocative problems, 
to the much more interesting and important "many person" case 
which is a serious obstacle to allocative efficiency. Un­
fortunately, Meade, along with Coase and others, appears not 
to have fully appreciated the importance of this distinction. 
Summary 
Because the two cases present different allocative 
problems, care should be taken to distinguish between situa­
tions in which the failure of competitive market outcomes 
to be Pareto optimal is due to private good phenomena, and 
situations in which it is due to the existence of public 
goods. Defining "externality" as the case of jointly supplied 
private goods where one of the products is characterized by 
infeasibility of exclusion allows this distinction to be 
maintained. The distinction has been clouded, on the other 
hand, by the indiscriminate use of the term "externality" to 
apply both to cases which involve no allocative problems 
("pecuniary externalities"), and to cases in which in­
efficiency may be due to the existence of public goods 
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("technological externalities"). Brief mention should also 
be made that the reason Buchanan and Stubblebine's "Exter­
nality" (11) was neglected in the above discussion is that, 
as will be seen, "Buchanan-Stubblebine externalities" are 
characterized by jointness, and fit more logically, therefore, 
in a discussion of public goods. 
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CHAPTER IV. PUBLIC GOODS 
The failure of competitive markets to produce Pareto 
optimality can be caused by the existence of either public 
goods or externalities.^ Since externalities are, by defi­
nition, associated exclusively with private goods, the funda­
mental distinction between public and private goods serves 
also to distinguish between public goods and externalities; 
that is, public goods are characterized by jointness whereas 
private goods, and therefore externalities, are not. Joint­
ness exists whenever one individual's consumption of a unit of 
some public good does not preclude the possibility of others' 
being able simultaneously to consume that same unit. Any 
good characterized by jointness is, by definition, a public 
good, regardless of whether or not it is also characterized 
by impossibility of exclusion. Because of jointness, indi­
viduals have no incentive to reveal their true preferences 
for public goods, and this prevents the attainment of 
Pareto optimality. 
Theoretical Forerunners 
The origins of modern public good theory are found in 
writings on taxation dating back to the Middle Ages. Two 
^The assumption will continue to be made that competi­
tive equilibrium is a realizable goal. This implies, in 
turn, an assumption of universal non-increasing returns to 
scale (convex production sets). 
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distinct principles or approaches to taxation have developed 
through the years: the benefit approach and the ability-to-
pay approach. The benefit approach says that individual tax 
obligations should be based on the benefits received from 
the enjoyment of public services, while the ability-to-pay 
approach says that individual tax obligations should be 
based on capacity to pay. Both the benefit approach and the 
ability-to-pay approach were viewed by the writers of the 
peiiod between the seventeenth and twentieth centuries as 
standards of equity, not of efficiency (30, p. 63). The 
protection of property rights was regarded during this period 
as the basis for the existence of governments, and since the 
amount of protection an individual received was viewed as 
being in direct proportion to his wealth, "fairness" was 
thought to require a distribution of tax shares according to 
wealth.^ 
2 Adherence to the view that governments are formed to 
protect property rights and that individuals benefit from 
this protection in proportion to their wealth allows a 
synthesis of the benefit and ability-to-pay approaches to 
taxation. This is reflected in Adam Smith's first maxim 
of,taxation (48, p. 310). 
"The subjects of every state ought to contribute to­
ward the support of government, as nearly as possible, 
in proportion to their respective abilities; that is, in 
proportion to the revenue they enjoy under the protec­
tion of the state." 
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Toward the end of the nineteenth century, however, 
a fundamental change of emphasis occurred. Triggered by 
advances in subjective value theory, the benefit approach 
to taxation came to be viewed not primarily as a standard 
of equity, but as a requirement for allocative efficiency. 
The benefit approach, unlike the ability-to-pay approach, 
requires that the tax and expenditure sides of the budget be 
considered simultaneously. Pantaleoni (32) , who was one of 
the first economists to become concerned with problems of 
allocative efficiency in the public sector, argued that only 
the benefit approach, by requiring the simultaneous considera­
tion of tax and expenditure sides of the budget, provides a 
basis for determining whether or not the benefits of col­
lective spending are worth the cost in terms of reduced 
private spending. 
Accompanying the increased concern for efficiency of 
resource allocation in the public sector, public goods came 
to be recognized as a distinct phenomenon, differentiated 
from private goods by the characteristic of jointness. Since 
most programs of collective taxation and expenditure involve 
the supplying of public goods, attention came to be focused 
(1) on the requirements for allocative efficiency in public 
goods provision, and (2) on the ability of institutions to 
satisfy these requirements. These two questions now will be 
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considered in that same order. 
Optimality in the Provision of 
Public Goods 
Partial equilibrium approach 
Public goods efficiency will be discussed first in a 
partial equilibrium framework and then in a general 
equilibrium framework. While the general equilibrium approach 
is superior on grounds of realism and completeness, the par­
tial equilibrium approach does allow certain points to be 
emphasized. The partial equilibrium analysis will draw 
heavily on the work of Bowen (5) and Lindahl (24) , who 
developed independently what has come to be known as the 
"voluntary exchange" theory of public goods. The Bowen and 
Lindahl contributions are flawed by their erroneous asser­
tions that Pareto optimality in the provision of public 
goods will be produced by the free expression of individual 
preferences. Nevertheless, their analytical tools— 
especially the individual "demand" curves for public goods 
developed by Bowen—are very useful in discussing certain 
aspects of the allocation of resources to public goods. 
Individual "demand" curves for public goods should not 
be viewed simply as public good analogues of individual 
demand curves for private goods. In the case of public goods, 
unlike private goods, the possibility exists for consumption 
of units of a good purchased (and consumed) by someone else. 
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An individual's "demand" curve (curve of marginal evaluations) 
for a public good does not represent the prices that he 
necessarily must pay to consume various quantities of the 
good, since the possibility exists, even if the price is 
not paid, that the public good will be supplied by others. 
The individual will have a strong incentive to conceal his 
preferences for a public good, since if he is successful in 
avoiding payment his utility clearly will be increased. 
Whereas an individual demand curve for a private good repre­
sents the quantities which a "rational"^ individual will 
purchase in response to various given prices, the individual 
"demand" curve for a public good does not represent the 
prices that a "rational" individual will pay for a good the 
quantity of which he is unable independently to determine. 
To give emphasis to these fundamental differences between 
the two cases, individual "demand" curves for public goods 
will be referred to as "pseudo-demand" curves. 
In Figure 4.1 the quantity of a public good, X^, is 
measured along the horizontal axis, while price, measured 
as the ratio of the prices of and a private numeraire 
good, X^, is measured along the vertical axis. The assumption 
is made that the numeraire good has constant marginal utility 
for all individuals, so that no income-effect shifts in the 
3 A rational individual is defined as one who attempts to 





Public Good (X. ) 
Figure 4.1. Bowen diagram 
curves occur. The curves and Dg are the pseudo-demand 
curves for the public good of individuals A and B, respective­
ly. Since each point on a pseudo-demand curve represents 
an equality of P^/P^ and marginal rate of substitution between 
Xp and X^ (MRS), the curves and could be labeled MRS^ 
and MRSg, respectively.^ The curve (EMRS) is the vertical 
summation of curves (MRS^) and Dg(MRSg), and represents 
the total pseudo demand of the two individuals for the public 
good. Vertical summation is required because any given 
quantity of the public good is consumed simultaneously by 
both individuals. The marginal cost of producing the public 
^This is the notation generally employed by Samuelson (41, 
46). 
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good—in terms of the private good—is assumed to be constant 
and is represented by the curve MC. 
The Pareto-optimal output of the public good is OP, where 
the individuals' summed marginal evaluations (pseudo-demands) 
equal marginal cost; or, using different terminology, OP 
is Pareto optimal because it represents equality between the 
individuals' summed marginal rates of substitution (EMRS) 
and marginal cost.^ If output OP could be attained, the way 
in which the cost of that output is distributed between the 
two individuals is a question of equity rather than efficiency 
under the assumptions of this model. That is, since the 
assumption has been made that the marginal utility of the 
numeraire good is constant for both individuals, redistri­
butions of income (in terms of the numeraire good) do not 
change the optimal output. If the endowments prior to the 
production of the public good are judged to be "just" in 
the light of the full set of production possibilities, then 
a distribution of tax shares on the basis of individual 
marginal evaluations (MRS) will not disrupt that welfare 
judgement. If, on the other hand, the initial endowments 
are judged to be "unjust", the individual tax shares could 
be set so that the post-tax distribution of income is "just". 
^That OP is, in fact, Pareto optimal will become 
clearer when the problem is analyzed in a general equilibrium 
framework. 
39 
The point is, however, that the Pareto optimal point 
OP probably will not be attained, since individuals will have 
no incentive to reveal their true marginal evaluations for 
the public good. Furthermore, there exists no means by 
which an external observer can determine an individual's 
true marginal evaluation.^ In a small group situation such 
as the one depicted, each individual sees the possibility of 
consuming the public good at the others' expense, and the 
employment of strategy probably will prevent the attainment 
of Pareto optimality. According to Buchanan, (6, p. 84). 
"In small group situations, each potential trader is 
motivated to behave strategically, to bargain, in an 
attempt to secure differentially favorable terms. Here 
the individual will find it to his advantage to conceal 
his true preferences and to give false signals about 
these preferences to his opponents-partners." 
If, on the other hand, the number of consumers of the 
public good is "large", individuals will not expect to in­
fluence the decisions of other individuals, and "strategic" 
behavior will not be employed. Instead, each person is apt 
to adjust his own behavior to the behavior of "others" taken 
as a group, without the expectation that the behavior of the 
"group" may change. Each individual, operating on the belief 
that whether or not he contributes to the provision of the 
^The ability of an external party to determine iudiviaaal 
marginal evaluations will be discussed below at greater length, 
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public good will have little effect on the total supply, 
will have no incentive to reveal his true preferences. This 
is the "free-rider" problem. Of course, the aggregate effect 
of such behavior will be significant.^ 
While the partial equilibrium approach to optimality in 
the provision of public goods is informative and in no 
sense wrong, the assumption of constant marginal utility of 
the numeraire good is very restrictive. In moving to a 
general equilibrium framework this assumption can be dropped, 
which will permit an explicit recognition of the relationship 
between equity and efficiency in public goods supply. 
Diagrammatic general equilibrium approach 
The development in a general equilibrium framework of 
the conditions for Pareto optimality in the provision of a 
public good allows the restrictive assumption of constant 
marginal utility of the numeraire good to be dropped and 
thereby permits an explicit recognition of the interrelation­
ship between distribution and allocative efficiency. The 
following analysis will draw heavily on the work of P. A. 
Samuelson (41) , who was the first to develop a general 
equilibrium theory of public goods. The arguments will be 
presented first in diagrammatic form, and then mathematically. 
7 Olson (31) has developed a very thorough analysis of 
ÇITOup SxZc* 
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The diagrammatic approach is presented in Figures 4.2, 
4.3, and 4.4. 
Figure 4.2, the transformation function for private and 
public goods, relates the maximum quantities of private and 
public goods that can be produced with existing technology 
and a fixed resource endowment. The combination of private 
and public goods that is actually produced will depend on 
consumer preferences and the distribution of income. Assume 
initially that only private goods are produced and that they 
are distributed between two individuals, A and B, in a manner 
that is considered "just". In Figure 4.2 the maximum 
possible output of private goods is seen to be OE, and the 
initial endowments are assumed to be OC for individual A 
(Figure 4.3) and OD for individual B (Figure 4.4), where 
OC + OD = OE. Assume further that both individual A's and 
individual B*s factor incomes do not change with changes in 
the output mix of private and public goods. 
Public goods are assumed to be produced only if at least 
one of the individual's welfare can be improved (while caus­
ing no harm to the other). Figures 4.3 and 4.4 depict a 
situation in which the production of public goods will cause 
a movement toward the utility-possibility frontier. In 
Figure 4.3, individual A*s consumption of private goods is 
measured along the horizontal axis and his consumption of 



























combinations of private and public goods which bring indivi­
dual A the same level of satisfaction as does his initial 
endowment of private goods, OC. By assumption, the production 
of public goods cannot be undertaken unless individual A is 
able to maintain a level of utility at least as great as 
represented by i^C. Although A is indifferent among the 
combinations on i^C, individual B will not share this in­
difference since A's location along i^C will determine B's 
consumption of both private and public goods. Individual B's 
consumption of public goods will, at any point along FE 
in Figure 4.2, be the same as A's, and B's consumption of 
private goods will equal the difference between the total 
production of private goods, again as shown on FE, and A's 
private goods consumption. 
Curve HD in Figure 4.4 depicts B's consumption of pri­
vate and public goods as A moves along his indifference curve 
i^C. If, for example, A is located at U on i^C, then his 
consumption of private goods is OM, B's consumption of private 
goods is OQ (OX-OM=OQ), and both A and B consume OJ of 
public goods. Of all the combinations along HD, individual 
B prefers T, since that is the point at which his indifference 
curve ig is tangent to his locus of consumption possibilities 
as determined by A's movement along i^C. Therefore, T is a 
Pareto-optimal point, given the initial allocation of private 
goods to A and B, and given the specific cost sharing scheme 
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represented by A's movement along i^C and B's corresponding 
movement along HD. 
At each level of provision of public goods as measured 
along the vertical axes in Figures 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4, the 
slope of HD is, by construction, equal to the difference 
between the slope of the transformation function (MRT) and 
the slope of A's indifference curve, i^C (MRS^). At the 
Pareto-optimal point T, the slope of HD is also equal to the 
slope of B's indifference curve, i^. Pareto-optimality, 
therefore, is characterized by equality of the marginal rate 
of transformation between public and private goods and the 
sum of individual A's and B's marginal rates of substitution 
between public and private goods. In other words, Pareto 
optimality requires that MRT=MRS^+MRSg. Returning briefly 
to Figure 4.1, point P can be seen to satisfy the requirement 
of equality between summed marginal rates of substitution 
and the marginal rate of transformation (marginal cost of 
the public good in terms of the numeraire good), so the 
pseudo-equilibrium output, OP, is Pareto-optimal. 
An infinite number of additional Pareto-optimal points 
could be derived in Figures 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4. One example 
is point S in Figure 4.3. Point S results from the same 
initial income distribution as point T, but it involves a 
cost-sharing scheme in which B moves along his indifference 
curve i^D, and h moves along the curxespoiiuii'iCj coiiSump;.. i-ca 
possibility curve GC. 
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All Pareto-optimal points such as S and T can be trans­
ferred to a utility possibility frontier on which the effi­
cient combinations are represented in terms of ordinal in­
dices of A's and B's utility. The curve P in Figure 4.5 
represents such a locus of Pareto-optimal points. 
U A |W 
0 
Figure 4.5. Utility frontier of Pareto-optimal efficiency 
points and its tangency to highest attainable 
social welfare contour 
A "best" point from among the infinity of Pareto-optimal 
points can be chosen only with the use of a social welfare 
function which permits the evaluation of the social gain or 
loss resulting when A's position is improved at the cost of 
B's, or vice versa. The contours labeled w*, w", and w'" are 
derived from a social welfare function, and the best point, 
B, is determined by the tangency of the utility possibility 
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frontier and the iso-social welfare contour, w". The point 
B, it should be noted, can be reached through an infinite 
number of combinations of initial endowments and cost-sharing 
O 
plans, all of which allow MRT=ZMRS. 
Mathematical general equilibrium approach 
The general equilibrium approach can also be developed 
mathematically. For example, the Lagrangian approach can be 
followed to maximize A's utility subject to (1) a fixed 
resource endowment, and (2) a constant level of utility for 
B. The ordinal utility functions of two individuals, A and 
B, can be represented as 
(4.1) = U^(X^,Xp) 
(4.2) U® = U^(X®,Xp) 
where 
= an ordinal index of A's utility, 
g 
U = an ordinal index of B's utility, 
X^ = the amount of private good X^ consumed by individual 
A, 
Û 
McGuire and Aaron (26) have pointed out very clearly 
the relationship between equity and efficiency in the pro­
vision of public goods. 
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= the amount of private good consumed by 
individual B, and 
Xp = the amount of public good consumed by both A and 
B. 
A transformation function, relating the combinations of X^, 
g 
X^, and X^ that can be produced with the economy's fixed 
resource endowment, R, is represented as 
(4.3) F(X^, X®, X ) = R. 
The Lagrangian expression to be maximized is 
(4.4) C() = U^(X^,X ) - X[F(X^,X®,Xp)-R] - y [U® (X® ,Xp)-Û®] , 
where X and y are Lagrangian multipliers, R is the fixed 
resource endowment, and U„ is a fixed level of B's (ordinal) 
utility. 
By first differentiating 4.4 with respect to X^, X^, 
and Xp, then setting the partial derivatives equal to zero, 
and finally eliminating the Lagrangian multipliers from the 





9U^ 9U® 9F 
"p , «P 
-
9U^ 9U® 9F 9X^ 
9X^ 9X® 
r 
Equation 4.5 shows that in order to maximize A's utili 
subject to a fixed level of B's utility, a combination of 
public and private goods should be produced such that A's 
and B's summed marginal rates of substitution equal the 
marginal rate of transformation between public and private 
goods. This is the same first order marginal condition 
that is satisfied by every Pareto-optimal point along the 
curve P in Figure 4.5. The second order conditions require 
Q 
The steps of the derivation of Equation 4.5 are as 
follows. 
1). Differentiate Equation 4.4 with respect to X^, 
Lp, and set the partial derivatives equal to zero.^ ^ 
a) = 4 - x|L = 0 , b) + plE' = 0 
r ""r ~ ""r ' ""r 
ax^ 3X^ ^^r ax® ^^r ^sx® 
2). Divide (c) by (b). 
d) 






Divide (d) by (a) to 
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the proper convexities of the utility and transformation func­
tions . 
In dealing with private goods, the marginal conditions 
for Pareto optimality require equality between all individual 
marginal rates of substitution and the marginal rate of 
transformation. Letting and represent the amounts of 
a second private good consumed, respectively, by individuals 
A and B, the Pareto optimality conditions for private goods 
are the following; 
9U^ 3P 




The optimality requirements of Equations 4.5 and 4.6 
can be generalized to the case of s individuals (i = l,...,s), 
n private goods (j = l,...,n), and m public goods (k = 
l,...,m). The total quantity consumed of any private good, 
X., equals the summation of the quantities consumed by the s 
s i 
individuals, so that X. = E X. . The total quantity con-
3 i=l ] 
sumed of any public good, X^^^, equals the quantity consumed 
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by each individual, so that X ,, = X^,, Each individual 
n+k n+k 
is assumed to possess a continuous, convex, ordinal utility 
function of the form U^=U^ (X^,. . . ,X^_j_^) . The production 
possibility function is also assumed to be convex and con­
tinuous and is represented as F(X^y...,X^^^)=0, where pro­
duction inputs are "negative" goods. The procedure will be 
followed of writing the partial derivative of any function 
with respect to its argument by a j subscript; e.g., 
" î - s i  •  
The equilibrium conditions represented in Equations 4.5 
and 4.6 for the two-person, two-good case can be rewritten 
in generalized form, respectively, as 
s F 
(4.7) Z "1"^ = (i = l,...,s; k = l,...,m) 
i=l uj ^1 
F. 
(4.8) (i = l,...,s;j = 2,...,n) 
Ui ^1 
The infinity of Pareto-optimal solutions to Equations 4.7 
This equation, together with the requirement that each 
individual's consumption of such a good leads to no substitu­
tion from any other individual's consumption of that good, 
constitute Samuelson's 1954 definition of a public good (45). 
He acknowledged recently that this definition has caused a 
certain amount of confusion (46, p. 108). Some economists 
apparently took the requirement of "equal consumption" to mean 
that each person's marginal evaluation for a public good must 
be the Sâûlc, wliicli, Ox oouisc, xtj iivL Lliti câse. A particular 
good might be liked by some people and disliked by others. 
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and 4.8 can be represented on an ordinal utility possibility 
frontier. To determine which point on the frontier is social­
ly most desirable requires a social welfare function, which 
can be represented as 
(4.9) w = w(U^,. .. ,Ug) 
where Uj>0. One more equilibrium condition must be added, 
therefore, to determine the best of all possible Pareto-
optimal configurations. This condition can be written as 
w 
(4.10) = 1 (i = 2,...,s) . 
WiUi 
Equation 4.10 is simply the mathematical expression of the 
tangency between w" and P represented in Figure 4.5. 
Equation 4.8, representing the optimality conditions 
for private goods, will be satisfied automatically in a 
competitive economy characterized by the proper convexities 
and an absence of externalities. On the other hand. Equation 
4.7, representing the optimality conditions for public goods, 
will not be satisfied by a system of competitive markets. 
The reason, of course, is that consumers have no incentive to 
reveal their true preferences for goods characterized by 
jointness. 
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Voting and public goods optimality 
Because of the strong tendency for individuals not to 
reveal their true preferences for public goods, such goods 
generally are provided (financed) collectively. The argument 
has been made that public goods theory is, in effect, an 
economic theory of government (9, p. 25). Unfortunately, 
however, the collective provision of public goods does not 
insure Pareto-optimal outcomes. 
The "free-rider" problem characteristic of large group 
situations involving public goods can be eliminated only 
when each individual is made aware that his own behavior 
does affect the total outcome. Wicksell (52) concluded that, 
ideally, all group decisions on public goods provision should 
be made under a unanimity voting rule. Strict unanimity 
can be viewed as effectively transforming the case involving 
large numbers of consumers of a public good into a small 
number case involving just two parties; the individual, and 
the "rest of the group". Although the "free-rider" problem 
is eliminated, it may be replaced with problems of strategy 
inherent in two-person games. 
The problems of strategy associated with unanimity voting 
will be minimized if the individual taxpayer believes that 
his acceptance or rejection of a specific cost-sharing 
V* .t. ^  _L. ixCiVG  ^^  L. w wxi  ^ u- w J-
presentation of subsequent proposals. That is, if a person 
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is confronted with a proposal which provides him with a net 
gain, but at the same time he feels that a subsequent proposal 
may be even more to his advantage, then he will veto the 
current proposal. If he feels, on the other hand, that 
subsequent proposals are just as likely to be unfavorable as 
favorable, then he may abandon strategy and vote "yes" on 
the current proposal. 
Most individuals confronted with a unanimity voting rule 
might be expected to vote in favor of cost-sharing proposals 
which present them with net benefits (a "taxpayer's surplus") 
and which allocate the remainder of the costs in a manner 
considered "just". Expecting every individual to behave in 
such a manner probably would be unrealistic, however. There 
would seem to be a strong likelihood that for nearly every 
proposal submitted to the group at least one individual, 
employing strategic behavior, will cast a negative vote and 
defeat the proposal. Unanimity thus presents essentially 
the same problem as that when coercion is lacking completely; 
few, if any, public goods will be provided. Although the un­
animous approval of a proposal represents, by definition, a 
movement toward Pareto optiraality, the problem is to secure 
the passage of any cost-sharing proposal put before the group. 
Wicksell recognized this shortcoming of unanimity voting 
and was led to modify his scheme by substituting "relative 
unanimity" for strict unanimity. He viewed "relative unanimity" 
as a five-sixths majority, although the basis of this particu­
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lar choice is unclear. Majority voting schemes, however, are 
subject to the problem of cyclical majorities (the "paradox 
of voting") discussed in the pioneering works of Dodgson 
(17), Black (4), and Arrow (1). Strictly speaking, there 
is no assurance that any voting rule short of strict unanimity 
will produce, in the absence of side payments, a movement 
toward Pareto optimality.The point already has been 
made, however, that the employment of strategy will serve 
to prevent the passage of measures under unanimity. The con­
clusion must be reached that voting, like voluntarism, general­
ly will not produce Pareto optimality in the provision of 
public goods. 
Nonexclusion and Public Goods 
Jointness has been defined above as the fundamental 
characteristic of public goods. That is, a public good has 
been defined as any good characterized by jointness. Confusion 
exists, however, as to whether or not nonexclusion from con­
sumption should be viewed as a second essential characteristic 
^^Buchanan and Tullock (12, p. 152) point out that in 
the absence of side payments or vote trading each person's 
vote carries the same weight. This prevents the individual 
voter from being able to express his intensity of preference 
for or against a particular measure. Permitting those citi­
zens who feel strongly about an issue to compensate those 
whose opinion is only feebly held can result in gains for 
both groups. 
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of public goods. There are those who argue that nonexclusion 
is a fundamental characteristic of public goods (30, pp. 
7-8; 21; 31, p. 14; 18, pp. 248-249), that where exclusion 
is possible services do not fall under the strict definition 
of a public good (33, p. 121), and/or that the distinctive 
feature of public goods is that exclusion costs something 
(28, p. 69). Some refer to nonexclusion as a characteristic 
of those public goods which must be provided publicly, 
often without commenting on whether or not nonexclusion is a 
fundamental characteristic of public goods however provided 
(7, p. 18; 10, pp. 17-19; 30, p. 126; 47, pp. 66-74). In 
the following argument, however, support is given to the view 
expressed above that if a good is characterized by jointness 
it is a public good, regardless of whether or not exclusion 
is possible. 
To demonstrate that exclusion does not eliminate the 
problems inherent in the provision of public goods, assume 
a situation in which a perfectly discriminating monopolist 
has a franchise for supplying a public good, and that this 
monopolist has the ability to exclude from consumption all 
those who do not pay. Some economists have argued that Pareto 
optimality will result from such a situation, but this 
erroneous assertion is based on a misunderstanding of the role 
of exclusion as it relates to public goods. 
Suppose the monopolist were able to bargain on an all-
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or-nothing basis with each potential consumer of the public 
good. Unless, however, he possesses the power to know what 
is in peoples' minds, he will find it quite impossible to 
determine individual consumers' true marginal evaluations 
for the public good. Consumers will understate their true 
preferences, for although the monopolist is able to exclude 
people who do not pay, he has no way to prevent people from 
paying less than their true marginal evaluations and becoming, 
in a sense, free-riders. Since the monopolist has no way to 
determine and collect consumers' true marginal evaluations, 
the public good will not be provided in the optimal quantity 
as determined by equality between summed marginal evaluations 
and marginal cost. Exclusion, therefore, even in the hands 
of a perfectly discriminating monopolist cannot change the 
fundamental nature of public goods; namely, that situations 
involving jointness inevitably cause consumers to understate 
their true preferences. 
Furthermore, cases exist in which exclusion, even if 
feasible, would be undesirable. Take, for example, the case 
of an uncrowded bridge. Construction of a toll booth and the 
levying of charges against those crossing the bridge would 
be a simple matter. This would, however, produce a non-
optimal state of the world since the marginal cost of an 
3/^/^ T 4-n r\r\ a 1 V%vi e t rt ne» t vt •nrr ma n r* 4-^r^ aTS 
Charging a toll would clearly violate the P=MC requirement 
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for Pareto optimality. If the bridge does become crowded 
to the point where an incremental crossing reduces the speed 
with which all those using the bridge at a point in time are 
able to cross, then the marginal cost of crossings is greater 
than zero and tolls may be required to efficiently allocate 
the use of this facility. The ability to exclude will 
facilitate this task, but it certainly does not convert the 
public good into a private good. The charging of tolls does 
not alter the fact, that given certain assumptions about 
capacity and the units of time employed, one individual's 
crossing the bridge does not preclude the possibility of 
others' being able to cross at the same time. 
The point should be emphasized that the question of 
tolls and bridge crossings is concerned with allocating the 
use of the public good, which is distinct from the problem 
of providing the bridge. Optimal provision of the bridge 
will require, as in the case of all public goods, the impos­
sible task of determining accurately individual marginal 
evaluations. 
Two Interpretations of "Increasing Returns" 
The notion of "increasing returns" can be given two dif­
ferent interpretations in the analysis of public goods, and 
considerable cuuZuylun has been caused by the indiscriminate 
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use of the term. The dual meaning of increasing returns is 
unique to public goods, and it arises because the output of 
public goods can be measured either in terms of production 
units or consumption units. In the case of private goods, 
on the other hand, production units and consumption units 
are, by definition, identical. 
To illustrate this problem suppose that there exists 
an island community with a single television station, and 
that the station's signals can be picked up by anyone on the 
island with a TV set. The television signals are a public 
good since they can be consumed by more than one person at 
the same time. Television output could be measured either 
as (1) viewer-hours per day, or (2) hours per day of trans­
mission. The first measure of output is in terms of con­
sumption units while the second is in terms of production 
units. 
Television costs can be examined either in terms of 
12 A certain amount of confusion has been caused by the 
use of the term "increasing returns" in the following se­
quence of articles; Samuelson's "Aspects of Public Expendi­
ture Theories" (39), Samuelson's "Public Goods and Subscrip­
tion TV; Correction of the Record" (44), Buchanan's "Public 
Goods in Theory and Practice: A Note on the Miniasian-
Samuelson Discussion" (8), and Samuelson's "Pitfalls in the 
Analysis of Public Goods" (43). In the first two articles 
Samuelson seems to refer to increasing returns in terms of con­
sumption units. Buchanan then clearly employs the notion of 
increasing returns in terms of production units. In Samuel­
son's final article of the sequence the reader is left with 
little choice but to conclude that Buchanan's use of the term 
has been adopted. 
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viewer-hours per day or hours per day of transmission. In 
terms of the former, television transmission is clearly a 
case of increasing returns. Once a capacity to transmit 
signals is established, the marginal cost of increasing 
the number of viewer-hours per day is zero. This follows 
from the definition of public goods, which implies increasing 
returns in terms of consumption units. 
The phenomenon of increasing returns in terms of 
production units, on the other hand, is due to factors that 
bear no relationship to the publicness or privateness of 
the good. A priori predictions of increasing returns based 
on the consumption characteristics of goods are not possible 
if output is measured in terms of production units. In terms 
of the island television station, whether television output, 
measured as hours per day of transmission, displays increas­
ing, decreasing, or constant returns is an empirical question 
that is not related to the fact that the signals happen to 
be a public good. 
An analytical bond does exist, however, between public 
goods and increasing returns in terms of production units. 
When increasing returns of this type exists, perfect compe­
tition will not be self-sustaining since firms that equate 
price and marginal cost will suffer continuing losses. If 
 ^V* m f* "S T •» "I X. ^   ^ m  ^ T  ^^  t x* 
* W W  ^^ .L. Xw, ^ .W Sa» «k» ^ ^ O  ^  ^^  .L. W ^ * A ^ f 
subsidy will be required to ensure their continued 
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existence.The determination of whether or not a particu­
lar decreasing cost firm should receive a subsidy must take 
into account the total benefits to society generated by 
that firm's activity. This requires the proper weighting and 
summation of inframarginal consumers' and producers' sur­
pluses, a task not unlike the determination of individual 
marginal evaluations for public goods. 
Buchanan-Stubblebine "Externalities" 
Although the title of Buchanan and Stubblebine's 
"Externality" (11) suggests that this well-known article 
should be included in a discussion of externalities, this 
was not done because Buchanan and Stubblebine's "externali­
ties" are characterized by jointness and involve, therefore, 
public goods. Buchanan and Stubblebine set out in their 
article to "clarify the notion of externality by defining it 
rigorously and precisely" (11, p. 1). In defining exter­
nalities "rigorously and precisely" they actually have de­
fined public goods,including cases where public goods are 
supplied jointly along with one or more private goods. 
13 If the firms are not constrained to marginal cost 
pricing, monopoly likely will result. 
14 The authors, themselves, comment, "...our analysis al­
lows the whole treatment of externalities to encompass the 
consideration of purely collective goods" (11, p. 383). 
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Cases will be considered where an activity y^, under 
the control of individual 1 affects the utility of one or more 
additional individuals.^^ An "externality" in the Buchanan-
Stubblebine sense exists, in its simplest form, when an 
activity y^, under the control of individual 1 affects the 
utility of one other party, individual 2. 
The utility function of individual 2 is defined as 
(4.11) (X^,...rX^,y^) 
where X^,...,X^ are activities under his own control. A 
2 2 
"marginal externality" exists when ^ 0, where is the 
partial derivative of individual 2's utility function with 
respect to y^. If, through a change in the scale of y^ 
individual 2's welfare can be improved without harming indi­
vidual 1, then the "marginal externality" qualifies as a 
"Pareto-relevant externality". A marginal externality is 
Pareto-relevant when 
"i "Î (4.12) (-) —ô > (—Î— —r) and when —5- < 0 , and 
"r "r "r 
°1 "1 "1 (4.13) -i < (-) (-i - -^) when -y ) 0. 
< "r "r 
^^The same conclusions would be reached if, instead, 
cases were considered in which the activity y, affects the 
production functions of one or more additional firms. 
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In Equations 4.12 and 4.13 the terms and denote, 
respectively, the activities of individuals 1 and 2 in "con 
suming" some numeraire commodity. The ratio F^/F^, is indi­
vidual I's marginal rate of substitution between y^ and y^ 
consumption or exchange, i.e., the marginal cost of perform 
ing activity y^^ in terms of y^. Equation 4.12 represents 
a "Pareto-relevant external diseconomy" while Equation 4.13 
represents a "Pareto-relevant external economy." 
Pareto optimality requires that the inequalities in 
Equations 4.12 and 4.13 be converted to equalities by an 
adjustment in the scale of y^. In the case of Pareto-
relevant external diseconomies this will require that the 
scale of y^ be reduced, while Pareto-relevant external 
economies call for an expansion of y^. Pareto equilibrium 
is defined to exist when 
2  1 1  2  
u: u: F, uf 
(4.14) (-) = (-^ and when -| < 0, and 
"r "r °r 
"i "i "i (4.15) = (-) (.4 f) when -y > 0. 
"r °r "r 
Rearrangement of the terms in either Equation 4.14 







Equation 4.16 indicates that for Pareto optimality the sum 
of the two individuals' marginal rates of substitution, or 
marginal evaluations for , must equal the marginal cost 
of y2 in terms of y^. The similarity between Equation 4.16 
and the equation for optimality in the provision of public 
goods is clear. Equation 4.16 can be generalized simply 
by dropping the assumption that only one external party is 
affected by y^/ and replacing it with the assumption that 
s-1 individuals in addition to individual 1 are affected. 
The first-order condition for Pareto-optimality then becomes 
S FÎ-
(4.17) Z -T = -T , 
i=l pl 
which is identical to Equation 4.7, the first order condition 
for Pareto optimality in the provision of public goods. 
The basis for the summation of individual marginal rates 
of substitution (vertical summation of pseudo-demand curves) 
in the case of Pareto-relevant externalities is the existence 
of two closely related phenomena: (1) Individual I's activity, 
y^, simultaneously affects one or more other individuals, and 
(2) the affected individuals are not able to determine inde­
pendently the quantities they consume of the good (or "bad"). 
In other words, Pareto-relevant externalities are character­
ized by the allocative problem inevitably associated with 
jointness; namely, that neither market nor non-market means 
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can be relied upon to automatically generate Pareto 
optimality. 
The similarities between public goods and Pareto-relevant 
externalities are clear: a Pareto-relevant externality exists 
when a public good is provided in an amount that is not Pareto 
optimal. The argument might be made, however, that this 
interpretation overlooks an important distinction between 
the two concepts based on the fact that Pareto-relevant ex­
ternalities can involve not only public goods produced on 
their own merit, but also public goods that are supplied 
jointly as a "by-product" in the provision of private goods. 
Careful evaluation of these two cases reveals that this "dis­
tinction" is, in terms of outcomes, more apparent than real. 
Consider first the case where an individual, firm, or 
government provides a public good singly, i.e., not as a 
joint output in the production of a private good. The 
quantity provided of the public good probably will be non-
optimal owing to the phenomenon of nonrevealed preferences. 
This creates a Pareto-relevant externality. An optimizing 
individual or firm may expand output to the point where 
private marginal evaluation equals marginal cost, but this 
will not be socially optimal if other parties are affected 
by the activity. Notice in Equations 4.12 and 4.13 that 
when individual 1 has achieved utility-maximizing equilibrium 
so that the terms in parentheses cancel, there will still be 
a Pareto-relevant externality. 
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Pareto-relevant externalities may also exist in cases 
where one or more public goods are supplied jointly in the 
production of a private good. These cases, characterized 
both by Marshallian joint supply and by jointness, will 
be called "merit goods". The failure to attain Pareto opti-
mality in the provision of merit goods is owing not to the 
existence of joint supply, but to the fact that one of the 
jointly supplied products happens to be a public good. Be­
cause merit goods are of considerable importance—examples 
involve air and water pollution, education, and health care— 
but appear to be poorly understood, they will be analyzed 
in considerable detail in the next chapter. 
Summary 
The fundamental distinction between externalities and 
public goods is that public goods (including Buchanan-
Stubblebine type "externalities") are characterized by 
jointness. In situations involving jointness, consumers 
have no incentive to reveal their true preferences because 
the possibility exists of consuming units of a good provided 
and consumed simultaneously by others. Because of jointness, 
neither market nor nonmarket means generally will achieve 
Pareto optimality in the provision of public goods. This is 
true regardless of the possibility or impossibility of 
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exclusion, or of whether or not a good is characterized by 
joint supply as well as jointness. 
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CHAPTER V. MERIT GOODS 
Merit goods^ are defined as cases of joint supply 
where at least one of the jointly supplied products is a 
public good. Thus, merit goods are characterized both by 
joint supply and by jointness. The existence of merit goods 
causes a failure of competitive market outcomes to be 
Pareto optimal; the basis for this "market failure" is made 
clear by distinguishing carefully between "joint supply" 
and "jointness". 
"Joint Supply" and "Jointness" 
The standard case of joint supply is that in which two 
or more tradeable private goods are provided from the same 
production unit, e.g., wool and mutton are supplied jointly 
from sheep. Jointness, on the other hand, occurs when a 
single (public) good may be consumed by more than one indi­
vidual at a time. Confusion between joint supply and joint­
ness has arisen because both involve the vertical summation 
Musgrave (30, p. 13) has defined ""lerit wants" as those 
wants "considered so meritorious that their satisfaction is 
provided for through the public budget, over and above what 
is provided for through the market and paid for by private 
buyers." This definition includes not only the concept of 
merit goods, but also extends to cases in which underconsump­
tion of certain goods results from consumer ignorance or 
irrationality. If the usual assumptions of perfect information 
and consumer rationality are made, however, the noneconomic 
iuoxdlist and elitist overtones are stripped rrom the merit 
want concept and what remains is the concept of merit goods 
as defined here. 
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of demand curves (pseudo-demand curves in the case of joint-
ness). Overshadowing this apparent similarity are fundamental 
differences, however. 
Jointly supplied private goods 
The market demand curve for sheep is derived by adding 
vertically (with proper adjustments for units of measurement) 
the market demand curves for wool and mutton. Because 
wool and mutton are private goods, their market demand curves 
are derived by summing horizontally the individual demand 
curves for wool and mutton, respectively. This is illus­
trated graphically in Figure 5.1, with the aid of the follow­
ing assumptions: (1) mutton and wool are produced in 
constant proportions, (2) sheep are produced at constant cost, 
and (3) a numeraire private good, r, has constant marginal 
utility for each consumer. 
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Figure 5.1. Summation of demand curves in a case of jointly 
supplied private goods 
Equilibrium is at point E, where the price of sheep equals 
the summed prices of wool and mutton. 
Jointness 
Jointness, by definition, involves public goods. The 
total pseudo-demand curve for a public good, such as hours 
of television transmission, is derived by vertical summation 
of individual pseudo-demand curves. This is depicted 
graphically in Figure 5.2 with the following assumptions: 
(1) television signals are produced at constant cost, and 








Figure 5.2. Summation of pseudo-demand curves in a case 
of jointness 
Equilibrium is at point E where the summed marginal evalua­
tions of individuals 1 and 2 equal the marginal cost of supply­
ing TV signals. 
Fundamental distinctions 
Joint supply is characterized by vertical summation of 
market demand curves for different products, whereas jointness 
is characterized by vertical summation of individual pseudo-
demand curves for a single public good. Furthermore, the 
pseudo-demand curves for the public good are not true demand 
curves. Increasing the number of consumers of the public good 
accentuates the problem of non-revealed preferences, while 
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increasing the number of consumers of mutton and wool leads 
to a convergence in the usual fashion to the conditions of 
perfect competition. As Samuelson (40) has pointed out, 
increasing the number of consumers of a public good only 
makes attainment of Pareto optimality less likely, whereas 
increasing the number of sellers and buyers of jointly 
supplied private goods such as wool and mutton increases the 
relevance of supply-demand relations. 
Merit goods and "market failure" 
Failure to achieve Pareto optimality in the provision 
of merit goods is due, clearly, to the jointness character­
istic of the public good, and has nothing to do with the 
fact that the public good is supplied jointly with a private 
good. Situations such as air and water pollution—which 
involve the provision of merit goods—sometimes are character­
ized mistakenly as externalities. The danger in calling 
merit goods "externalities" is that the term "externality" 
may, for some, carry the implication that Pareto optimality 
can be achieved by "internalization", i.e., by effectively 
combining the acting and affected parties into a single 
decision-making unit. Internalization cannot prevent, how­
ever, the understating of marginal evaluations on the part of 
consumers of public goods, and will not assure Pareto 
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optimality in the provision of merit goods. The allocative 
problems associated with the provision of merit goods will 
be considered further through a discussion of two examples; 
a manufacturing process that causes water pollution, and edu­
cation. 
Water Pollution 
Assume that a paper manufacturing firm employs a process 
which causes large amounts of effluent to be discharged into 
a stream adjacent to its plant. Suppose, further, that the 
pollution of the stream reduces its value for downstream 
3 
recreation. In addition to the private good, paper the 
firm's activity produces a reduction of water quality which 
harms all downstream recreational water users. Water 
quality exhibits jointness because it can be "consumed" at 
the same time by two or more individuals, whether they be 
fishermen, swimmers, or boating enthusiasts. Since jointness 
2 A possible exception could arise in the event that all 
the consumers of the public good component are firms, not in­
dividuals. Internalization could then take the form of a 
merger of all firms under a single management unit, in which 
case the maximization of joint profits would produce a 
Pareto-optimal outcome. In the more likely case that some 
of the consumers of the public good are individuals, joint 
profit and utility maximization loses its operational sig­
nificance, since it would require the specification of a 
group utility function. 
Paper" is a rather broad term encompassing many dis-
if a specific paper product, say facial tissues, were employed 
as the private good. For simplicity's sake, however, the term 
"paper" will be retained. 
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is the fundamental characteristic of public goods, water 
quality is, by definition, a public good. The firm is en­
gaged, therefore, in the production of a merit good since a 
•J 
unit of output supplies jointly (1) a private good, paper, 
and (2) a public good, reduced water quality. 
Mathematical exposition of the problem 
If the firm's activity reduces the water quality "con­
sumed" by s individuals, the harmed parties' ordinal utility 
functions can be written as 
(5.1) (xj^,. .. ,Xp,Xg) (i=l,...,s) 
where (X^,...,Xp)are activities under individual i's control, 
with Xp designated as i's consumption of paper; and X^ is the 
water quality variable which is under the paper manufacturer's 
control. The transformation possibilities faced by the firm 
can be summarized as 
(5.2) F = F(X^,. . . ,X ,X ) 
where inputs are included as activities along with output. 
Using the subscript r to designate a numeraire commodity 
and adopting the convention of writing the partial derivative 
of a function with respect to its argument by a j sub­
script, the first order condition for Pareto optimality in 
the level of the firm's activity is 
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i F 
(5.3) —& + E —5 = ^  . 
"r ^=1 "r 
"d In Equation 5.3, is individual i's marginal rate of 
%r 
substitution between the numeraire commodity, r, and paper. 
In competitive equilibrium this ratio must be the same for 
all consumers and must equal the marginal cost, in terms of 
s uj 
r, of paper production. The term Z —% is the summation of 
i=l 
marginal rates of substitution between water quality, q, 
and the numeraire commodity for all those affected by the 
firm's water pollution. Since water quality is a 
public good, Pareto optimality requires that the summed 
marginal rates of substitution (individual marginal evalua­
tions for water quality in terms of r) equal the marginal 
cost of producing (reduced) water quality which, since water 
pollution is a by-product of paper production, is the marginal 
cost of paper production. The right hand side of Equation 
5.3 is the marginal rate of transformation between paper and 
the numeraire commodity, and can be interpreted as the marginal 
cost of producing paper in terms of r. Summarizing, Equation 
5.3 gives the first order marginal conditions for Pareto 
optimality in a case of Marshallian joint supply where one of 
the jointly supplied products happens to be a public good. 
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Diagrammatic exposition of the problem 
To depict graphically the above-described problem, the 
additional assumptions will be made (1) that paper and 
(reduced) water quality are produced in a constant ratio, and 
(2) that the numeraire good has constant marginal utility for 
all the harmed parties. The diagrams will be kept relatively 
simple by assuming the existence of only three individuals 
affected by changes in water quality. 
In Figure 5.3, is the demand curve faced by the firm 
for its primary output, paper, with paper production measured 
along the horizontal axis in units of reduced water quality. 
Dp is horizontal since, by assumption, the market for paper 
12 3 is perfectly competitive. The curves D^, D^, and D^ repre­
sent the pseudo-demands for water quality of individuals 1, 
1 2 2, and 3, respectively. The vertical summation of D^, D^, and 
Dq yields D^, the total pseudo-demand curve for reduced water 
12 3 quality. D^, D^, D^, and, consequently, D^, lie below the 
horizontal axis since water quality diminishes for movements 
from left to right along that axis, and the three individuals 
receive negative marginal benefits from increasingly pol­
luted water. Total demand for the firm's jointly supplied 
products, paper and reduced water quality,- is derived by 
vertically summing D^ and D^, yielding the curve (D^ + D^). 
12 3 Note that the vertical summation of D^, D^, and D^ is 
justified on the basis that water quality is a public good 






0 (Decreasing) Water Quality 
Figure 5.3. Conditions for optimality in the 
provision of water pollution 
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whereas the vertical summation of and D(sj^ aiic3 is required be 
cause paper and reduced water quality are j|Jty aire Marshallian joint 
4 products. 
The Pareto-optimal level of the f 1 rm' fiam' s activity, 
measured as output OE of reduced wateî" qua^juJter quality, is determined 
by the intersection of marginal cost, MC, MC, and (D^ + D^) . 
Output OE is Pareto optimal because o#l.y only at that point do 
the summed marginal benefits of the harrtiecJirji liaroed parties plus the 
equilibrium price of paper (Pp/P^) , e<qu.al ),j) equal the marginal cost 
of production. 
Approaches to optimality 
Although output OE is Pareto opti^oal ^i}i||(ptimal, it will not, in 
general, be attained through either laarkeidft marlcet or non-market 
forces. The reason is, of course, th-a-t wasmittliat water quality is 
a public good and, as was shown in Ch-aptexiiilJClisP'^sr 4, Pareto effi­
ciency is a very elusive goal where publiQiSi] p"ubllic goods are 
concerned. Actual output will be greater preat^er than OE, the firm's 
private profit maximizing output bei^g OF.,}(iiiiig OF. Although for any 
output greater than OE the possibility exij|||iiky «exists of increasing 
the welfare of some individuals whilg harn^iijlle h .arming no one, these 
"gains from trade" probably will not loe f'uidlt be fully realized due 
to the problems of strategic behavior assojioor a ssociated 
"^The market demand curve for ozyaper-,on the other nand, is 
derived by the horizontal summation ^ f inqi, of individual demand (not 
pseudo-demand) curves. 
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with the provision of public goods in small group situ­
ations. 
Voluntary action If the market system is relied 
upon to produce efficiency in resource use, a reduction of 
the paper manufacturer's output from the private profit 
maximizing output, OF, toward the Pareto-optimal output OE, 
will be accomplished only to the extent that recreational 
water users are able and, more importantly, willing to 
bribe the firm to limit its scale of activity. The problem 
with this procedure will obviously be to secure contribu­
tions from the harmed individuals. The firm will require, 
for each decrement of paper output, a payment at least as 
great as the difference between the price of paper, P^, and 
marginal cost, MC. As a group, the harmed individuals could 
pay for each decrement of paper output an amount equal to 
their summed marginal evaluations for improved water quality. 
They will not pay this amount, however, since each individual 
will be motivated to understate his true marginal evaluation 
in the belief that by so doing he will be able to con­
sume units of improved water quality provided by 
others. This phenomenon will be more pronounced the larger 
the number of harmed individuals. Although each individual's 
actions may produce a negligible effect on the ultimate out­
come, Lhe collectivity of individual actions v.'ill be gignifi-
cant. 
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The market system may succeed, nevertheless, in bringing 
about some reduction of the firm's output from the level OF. 
The reason is that for the initial decrements of output the 
summed marginal evaluations of the harmed parties for im­
proved water quality is substantially greater than the dif­
ference between and MC. In fact, a single individual 
might realize an increase in welfare by negotiating inde­
pendently for a reduction in paper output. If individual 
1, whose pseudo-demand curve for water quality is repre­
sented by Dq in Figure 5.3, acts alone to bribe the firm to 
reduce its output, the maximum possible reduction of output 
would be to level OC.^ At output OC the maximum amount 
individual 1 could pay for an increment of water quality (a 
decrement of water pollution) is equal to the minimum amount 
the firm would be willing to accept. Whether or not indi­
vidual 1 will realize a gain in welfare by his independent 
action depends on his ability to bargain with the firm over 
the range of output between OF and OC. In order to bribe 
the firm to reduce its output below the level OC, individual 
1 will have to secure the cooperation of one or more other 
harmed individuals, and this will lead to problems of 
strategic behavior and, as the number of parties to the 
^Either individual 2 or individual 3, acting independent­
ly on rhe oasis or individual marginal evaluations, could 
afford to secure a somewhat greater reduction of the firm's 
output than can individual 1. 
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bargain increases, to free-riders. 
Collective bribery Various forms of political 
"internalization" are often proposed as means by which to 
overcome the obvious shortcomings of reliance on the market 
system and voluntarism in situations such as the one being 
explored.^ One possible form of nonmarket solution that 
might be suggested would be to create a governmental unit 
comprised of all the harmed parties and to endow that unit 
with the authority to bind each individual to collective 
decisions made through the application of a voting rule. Un­
fortunately, as was shown in Chapter IV, no voting rule short 
of full unanimity can be expected to produce, in the absence 
of side payments, Pareto-optimal outcomes. Unanimity, while 
eliminating the free-rider problem, possesses the disadvantage 
that for large groups the passage of any measure becomes 
virtually impossible. The passage under less than unanimity 
of a proposal for levying a tax against harmed parties for 
the purpose of generating revenue with which to bribe (sub­
sidize) the firm to reduce its output could very easily result 
in some individuals' welfare being less than if they were to 
continue to endure the pre-tax water pollution. That is, the 
^Internalization in the form of an actual merger of the 
firm and the harmed individuals into a single decision making 
unit is not a relevant alternative in the case being examined 
because the maximization of joint profits and welfare is not 
an operational concept as is the maximization of joint profits 
in the case of a merger involving only firms. 
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members of the winning coalition could exploit those outside 
the coalition. A unanimity voting rule would prevent winners 
from exploiting losers, but the likelihood of being able to 
put together a tax proposal that would meet with everyone's 
approval would be very small, especially if individuals vote 
strategically.^ 
Compensation An alternative nonmarket approach would 
be to tax the paper manufacturer and•compensate the harmed 
individuals. Ideally, the firm should pay a tax on each unit 
of output equal to the corresponding summed marginal evalua­
tions of the harmed individuals, with the proceeds of the 
8 tax going to the harmed individuals. To achieve Pareto 
optimality through this procedure would require an accurate 
evaluation of the harm to recreational water users for every 
level of paper production. Unfortunately, no method exists 
by which an external observer could determine accurately the 
pseudo-demands of the harmed parties. In this case the 
affected individuals will be motivated to overstate the amount 
of harm they suffer from water pollution in the hope that they 
will receive compensation in excess of their true marginal 
"'under a unanimity voting rule an individual might be led 
to vote against a proposal favorable to him if he feels that 
a subsequent proposal will be even more favorable. 
g 
To repeat a point made in Chapter II, Pareto optimality 
ib achieved by maximizing the firm's gain less r.he harmed 
individual's loss, and not, generally, by maximizing the 
firm's gain less the firm's tax less the harmed individuals' 
loss. 
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evaluations. Accurate determination of the total pseudo 
demand curve, D^, in Figure 5.1, while necessary for the 
attainment of Pareto optimality through a tax-subsidy plan, 
will not be possible. 
Direct controls Perhaps the most straightforward 
nonmarket approach to this water quality problem would oe to 
charge a government agency with the responsibility and power 
for determining the optimal level of paper production and, 
therefore, water pollution. However, such a plan obviously 
suffers from the same shortcoming as those considered above; 
namely, that since water quality is a public good, individual 
marginal evaluations will not be revealed and cannot be deter­
mined otherwise. The government agency will be unable, there­
fore, to dictate a Pareto-optimal solution. 
Evaluation of the alternatives Since none of the 
above-mentioned approaches, either market or nonmarket, can 
guarantee Pareto optimality, the question should be asked 
whether, on an a priori basis, there is reason to expect any 
one of the approaches to provide a closer approximation to 
the ideal solution than the others. The answer to this ques­
tion is that while none of the approaches appears to be 
superior to all the rest, the market approach, i.e. , solution 
by voluntary action, will probably produce a less desirable 
outcome than the nonmarket approaches. Tlie icascn is that 
the market approach must rely for its success on the inde-
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pendent actions of one or at most a few individuals in 
bribing the firm to reduce its output and thereby increase 
the level of water quality. 
The remaining harmed individuals become free-riders. 
The extent by which one, two, or three individuals can bring 
about a reduction of water pollution depends on their indi­
vidual and summed marginal evaluations for water quality. 
The greater the ratio of their summed marginal evaluations 
to the summed marginal evaluations of all harmed individuals, 
the closer will the market solution approach Pareto optimality. 
Therefore, unless one or a few individuals suffer a dis­
proportionately large share of the harm from reduced water 
quality, the market approach will not be expected to produce 
a close approximation to the ideal solution. The larger the 
number of harmed individuals, the less desirable will be the 
market solution, in general, relative to the nonmarket 
approaches. 
The discussion of the various approaches to the pro­
vision of a merit good has been conducted, thus far, under 
the assumption that efficiency is a function only of the 
level of output. Two additional factors, however, should be 
mentioned. The first is that the market and various non-
market mechanisms will themselves require different amounts 
of resources. Nonmarket solutions require the formation and 
maintenance of governmental units and therefore require a 
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greater devotion of resources than the market solution. This 
may partially or wholly offset any advantage the nonmarket 
approaches may have in moving the output of the mixed good 
closer to optimum. A second factor which must be considered 
is that there may exist more than one technology for the 
production of paper. That is, methods may exist which are 
less efficient in terms of paper manufacture but which 
cause a lesser amount of water pollution. The problem then 
becomes to determine, by the most efficient method, the 
optimal combination of paper output and technology. The 
point to be made is that the application of too narrow a 
view of efficiency may lead to the adoption of inferior 
solutions. 
Education 
Most forms of education produce two categories of bene­
fits; (1) the "private" benefits which accrue to the student 
and/or his family, and (2) the "external" benefits which 
9 
accrue to members of society outside the student's family. 
The most obvious and most easily measured private benefits 
Q 
In discussing education it is necessary, particularly 
when dealing with the elementary and secondary levels, to 
adopt the student's family rather than the individual student 
as the basic decision-making unit. The reason for this is 
twofold. First, the young student does not possess enough 
information to behave "rationally" with respect to his own edu­
cation, and secondly, the young student is incapable of 
riiiciiiuiiiy any yarL oT his euuOaLion. 
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of education are the increased productivity and earnings of 
the educated. Other private benefits, while difficult to 
quantify, are, nevertheless, important. For example, the 
mothers of school age children receive the benefit of child 
care services which may allow them to seek employment or to 
engage in other activities. Additional education can provide 
an individual with greater satisfaction in later years of 
past and continuing exposure to new ideas and cultural oppor­
tunities (16, p. 6). Members of the present and future family 
of the educated individual may benefit by virtue of informal 
education and improved intellectual environment in the home. 
These and other private benefits of education are actually 
a form of private good, since, by definition, they can be 
"consumed" only by the student and/or his family. 
The consumption of educational services produces, in 
addition to private benefits, several types of external 
benefits which, by definition, affect the utility of indi­
viduals outside the student's family. For example, an indi­
vidual's education may increase not only his own productivity, 
but the productivity of others, as well. In modern, indus­
trialized economies, production requires the close coordination 
and cooperation of many individuals, so that one worker's 
productivity affects the productivity of many other workers. 
External benefits in the form of reduced expenditures for 
crime prevention and welfare may result from increasing the 
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productivity of the members of families with very low incomes. 
Further, education improves the functioning of a political 
democracy by promoting minimum standards of citizenship 
along with equality of opportunity. Friedman makes this 
point in his comment "...the gain from the education of a 
child accrues not only to the child or to his parents but 
to other members of society; the education of my child 
contributes to other people's welfare by promoting a stable 
and democratic society" (20, p. 12). 
The various external benefits of education possess one 
characteristic in common; viz, they all exhibit jointness. 
That is to say, the external benefits generated by one indi­
vidual's consumption of educational services may affect the 
utilities of two or more additional individuals at the same 
time. Since jointness is the one characteristic that dis­
tinguishes public from private goods, the external benefits 
of education are, by definition, public goods. 
A production unit of education, say a student-year, is 
a merit good since it supplies jointly (in the Marshallian 
sense) both private goods (private benefits) and public goods 
(external benefits). As with other merit goods, neither 
market nor nonmarket means can be relied upon, in general, to 
produce Pareto optimality in the provision of educational 
benefits. This is owing not to the Marshallian joint supply 
characteristic, but to the fact that certain of the jointly 
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supplied educational benefits are public goods. 
Conditions for Pareto optimality in the consumption of 
educational services 
Figure 5.4 represents graphically the demands for the 
educational benefits provided by family I's consumption of 
educational services, while Figure 5.5 represents the de­
mands for the educational benefits provided by family 2's 
consumption of educational services.The curve in 
Figure 5.4 represents family I's private demand for its own 
children's education, and the curve represents the 
(vertically) summed pseudo-demands of all those who receive 
the external benefits generated by the education of family 
I's children. Curve represents the total demand for the 
education of family I's children and is derived by summing 
vertically the curves and D^. Note that vertical summa­
tion in the case of curve is required because the external 
benefits of the education of family I's children are a 
public good, while the vertical summation of and to 
get is required because the private benefits and external 
benefits generated by the education of family I's children 
are Marshallian joint products. The marginal cost of edu­
cating family I's children is assumed to be constant and 
2 2 2 is represented by curve MC. The curves D , D^, and D^, in 
^^The marginal utility of a numeraire private good is 
assumed to be constant for all individuals. 
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Figure 5.5 are the corresponding demands for the education 
of family 2's children, and MC is the (constant) marginal 
cost of providing this education. Costs per student-year 
of educating the children of families 1 and 2 are assumed 
to be identical. 
The socially optimum consumption of education by the 
children of family 1 is student years, where marginal 
cost equals the price (Pp^/P^^ family 1 is willing to pay 
for their own children's education plus the summed marginal 
evaluations of the recipients of the external benefits of 
these same children's education. The amount Pi/P^ is the fj L 
"subsidy" per student - year of education that is required 
for the attainment of Pareto optimality. In the absence of 
any subsidy, family 1 would achieve its private optimum at 
Qp student-years of education, which represents undercon­
sumption from the social point of view.The optimum out­
put, Q^, probably will not be achieved, however, because the 
external benefits are a public good and the "consumers" of 
this public good, like the consumers of other public goods, 
will have no incentive to reveal their true marginal évalua-
^^If family 1 privately consumes student-years of edu­
cation, a movement from to will not, necessarily, be 
Pareto optimal. A tax levied o8 the recipients of,the ex­
ternal benefits to finance a movement from to Qq may very 
well harm some of the taxpayers. Depending on the distribu­
tion of tax shares, an individual taxpayer may find himself 
on a lower level of utility when Qi of education is consumed 
by the children of family 1 than when Qp is consumed and 
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Figure 5.5. Family 2's consumption of education 
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tions. Competitive markets cannot be expected, therefore, 
to yield the ideal subsidy, P^/P^. Neither will taxation 
of the recipients of the external benefits necessarily 
produce Pareto optimality, since it is impossible for an 
observer external to the affected individuals to determine 
accurately either their individual or summed pseudo demands, 
and thus to determine the optimum tax levy. 
For family 2's children, the socially optimum con-
2 
sumption of education is student-years. There is no basis 
within the framework of this analysis to suppose that 
2 
will equal Q^, even if the assumption is made that the two 
families have the same number of children and that their age 
distributions are identical. If the analysis is limited to 
1 2 
elementary education, then the inequality of and 
is inconsistent with the practice of requiring every child 
to consume eight years of education. If, on the other hand, 
the analysis includes secondary education and the various 
forms of higher education, then this result is entirely con­
sistent with what occurs in actual practice. 
Financing of education 
Because, as has been argued, a production unit of educa­
tion is a merit good, then education should be financed by 
a combination of tuition and tax revenues. Buchanan calls 
this "mixed financing" (10, p. The allocation of costs 
between tuition and tax revenues will depend, ideally, on the 
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ratio of private benefits to external benefits. This ratio 
will vary considerably between different educational levels. 
While the ratio of private benefits to external benefits is 
probably quite low for elementary and secondary education, it 
would seem to be highest for vocational and certain types of 
professional training. This would help to explain why public 
elementary and secondary education in this country is financed 
exclusively by tax revenues. That is, the total pseudo-demand 
curve for the external benefits of a single child's consumption 
of education may be highly inelastic in the range of twelve 
student-years, thus reflecting taxpayer's belief that twelve 
years of formal schooling is a minimum requirement for the ex­
ercise of responsible citizenship in a political democracy. 
Further, since the property tax is virtually earmarked for edu­
cation, families can be expected to acquiesce in the level of 
property taxes up to the point where the marginal tax cost 
equals the marginal private benefits from the education of 
their own children. 
Determining the optimal curriculum 
Up to this point, curriculum has been one of the things 
impounded in ceteris paribus. Clearly, however, curriculum 
plays an important role in determining the ratio of private 
benefits to external benefits generated by any child's edu­
cation. In extending the analysis to include curriculum 
variability, optimality requires the proper quality as well 
as quantity of education for each family's children. The 
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necessary conditions for optimality in curriculum choice 
must be satisfied along with the necessary conditions for 
optimality in each family's consumption of educational ser­
vices . 
The problem of optimum curriculum choice for a single 
12 
student is conceptualized in Figure 5.6. Private benefits 
are measured along the vertical axis, external benefits along 
the horizontal axis. The assumption is made that the 
student's curriculum can be varied so as to produce any ratio 




Figure 5.6. Optimal curriculum 
12 
Buchanan (7, p. 404) , refers to this problem as one 
of determining the "externality mix." 
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The curves and C2 are iso-cost curves which are 
derived by mapping onto the surface of Figure 5.6 the contour 
lines from the appropriate total cost surface. Curve Cg 
represents a greater total outlay for the student's education 
than does curve C^. In order to select the optimal point 
(optimal curriculum) on each iso-cost curve, it is necessary 
to introduce a social welfare function which includes among 
its arguments the public and external benefits of education. 
The curves and W2 are contours from such a function, each 
curve representing a constant level of social welfare. These 
may be called iso-benefit curves, and curve represents a 
higher level of benefits than does curve W^. 
The optimal mix of private and external benefits for 
each level of total cost is determined by the tangency of 
iso-cost and iso-benefit contours. The locus of all 
such tangency points for an individual student consti­
tutes the optimal path of that student's education. In 
Figure 5.6, curve L is the optimal curriculum locus. The 
optimal point along the optimal curriculum locus is deter­
mined by the equality of marginal cost and the summed marginal 
evaluations of the recipients of the private and external 
benefits. As has been pointed out repeatedly, this point 
will be achieved only if all the affected individuals reveal 
•t-Vioi marginal oTra 1 na 4-i r>r<c f  m v -HVio or^noa-t-"i <~in a 1 Tionia-Fi -J-s .  
Unfortunately, the recipients of the external benefits—the 
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public good component of educational output—have no incentive 
to reveal their true marginal evaluations, so neither market 
nor nonmarket means can be relied upon to establish the 
Pareto optimal level of financing for the student's education. 
Final comments on education 
Two additional points need to be raised regarding the 
economic theory of education. First, attempts to "internal­
ize" the external benefits of education by increasing the 
size of school districts will not lead to efficiency in 
the provision of educational benefits. The external benefits 
of education are external to the family, and as Davis has 
commented, "...we cannot increase the size of the family until 
it is large enough to 'capture' all the benefits of educa­
tion" (16, p. 19). A final important point is that this 
analysis nowhere suggests that educational services should 
be collectively organized and supplied. Although collective 
action may be desirable to help overcome the free-rider 
problem in the financing of education, whether or not educa­
tional services are provided collectively or by private firms 
is a matter of relative efficiencies. 
Summary 
The merit good concept provides a valuable theoretical 
framework for analyzing a wide range of real world phenomena. 
For example, viewing education as a merit good provides in­
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sights into questions concerning both the demand and supply 
of educational services. Because education and other merit 
goods are characterized by jointness, they should be viewed 
as a form of public goods, not as a type of externality. 
As public goods, neither market nor nonmarket means can be 
relied upon to produce Pareto optimality in the provision 
of merit goods. 
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CHAPTER VI. SUMMARY 
The equilibrium conditions for a system of competitive 
markets will correspond to the requirements for Pareto 
optimality only if all prices equal marginal social benefits 
and marginal costs equal marginal social costs. This analysis 
has been concerned with the causes of divergencies between 
private and social net benefits. 
Two sources of inefficiency in a system of perfectly 
competitive markets have been distinguished: externalities 
and public goods. Externalities are defined as cases of 
joint supply where all the products are private goods, but 
where at least one of the products is characterized by in-
feasibility of exclusion. Public goods are characterized 
by jointness, where jointness is defined as that property 
of a good which allows its consumption by one individual 
not to preclude the possibility of its consumption by others 
at the same time. Externalities are a private good phenomenon 
and do not involve jointness, and so the jointness character­
istic provides the basis for distinguishing between exter­
nalities and public goods as sources of "inefficiency." 
Externalities 
Externalities are created when goods with nonzero shadow 
values do not receive their correct price because of the 
infeasibility of excluding those who would consume the good 
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without paying. The existence of externalities causes the 
inefficient use not only of the good characterized by in-
feasibility of exclusion, but of other factors used in con­
junction with that good plus the factors employed in pro­
ducing the good. This inefficiency is caused by a failure of 
institutional arrangements, i.e., by a lack of effective en­
forcement of property rights. The point must be emphasized 
that the failure is not due to the existence of jointness. 
Solutions 
In concept, two approaches exist for dealing with ex­
ternalities. First, externalities obviously would be elim­
inated by improved modes of enforcement and/or accounting. 
That is, technological advances or improved institutional 
arrangements would remove the source of the problem. A 
second conceptual possibility for eliminating the ineffi­
ciencies associated with externalities is through re­
arrangements of ownership. Specifically, externalities can 
be internalized by combining the producing and consuming 
units into a single decision-making unit. 
Public Goods 
The basis of market failure in the case of public goods 
is fundamentally different than in the case of externalities. 
Failure to achieve Pareto optimality in the provision of 
public goods is owing to consumers' lack of incentive to re­
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veal their true preferences for goods characterized by joint-
ness. This lack of incentive stems from a recognition that 
the possibility exists of consuming units of a public good 
provided (and consumed) by others. In situations involving 
small numbers of consumers of public goods the tendency exists 
for individuals to behave strategically in an attempt to se­
cure differentially favorable benefits. Each consumer seeks 
to modify the behavior of others in the group in a way which 
will maximize his own utility. An acknowledged gaming situ­
ation exists. In large numbers situations, on the other hand, 
the tendency for strategic behavior does not exist; rather, 
individuals adjust their behavior to the behavior of the 
"rest of the group" taken as a unit, without the anticipa­
tion that the group's behavior may change. The individual 
consumer assumes that the total quantity of public goods 
supplied will not vary significantly whether or not he con­
tributes to the cost of provision. Thus, he has a strong 
incentive not to contribute, i.e., to become a free-rider. 
Clearly, therefore, voluntary behavior generally will not 
produce Pareto optimality in the provision of public goods. 
Solutions 
Many public goods are provided collectively rather 
than through voluntary actions. Voting, however, does not 
guarantee Pareto optimality in the provision of public goods. 
Unanimity is the only voting rule that is not subject to 
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the problems of cyclical majorities, and in large groups the 
unanimous approval of any proposal for cost sharing in the 
provision of a public good is highly unlikely. It must be 
concluded, therefore, that neither market nor nonmarket 
means generally can be relied upon to achieve Pareto opti-
mality in the provision of public goods. This holds not only 
for "conventional" public goods, but also for merit goods, 
which are defined as cases in which a public good is supplied 
jointly along with one or more private goods. 
Externalities and public goods present quite different 
allocative problems, and these problems do not necessarily 
call for the same "solutions." Whereas inefficiencies 
associated with externalities can be eliminated through 
"internalization," the same is not true in the case of public 
goods. In light of these fundamental differences, care should 
be taken to distinguish between the two problems. Unfortunate­
ly / terms such as "market failure," "social cost," and 
"externality," as they are usually employed, do not provide 
a basis for such a distinction. 
Allocative Implications 
Of the two causes of divergencies between private and 
social net benefits that have been discussed, viz., externali­
ties and public goods, the most serious allocative problems 
would seem to be associated with the existence of public 
100a 
goods. This is based on two observations: (1) cases in­
volving jointness are abundant in the real world whereas ex­
ternalities probably are not, and (2) the attainment of 
Pareto optimality in the provision of public goods is virtual­
ly impossible, whereas rearrangements of ownership can elimi­
nate the inefficiencies associated with externalities. 
If public goods are commonplace in the real world, 
this leads to a rather uncomfortable situation. Since no one 
has yet discovered an algorithm for the attainment of Pareto 
optimality in the provision of public goods, nihilism about 
much of economics seems to be implied. 
In an attempt to answer this rather serious indictment, 
it is tempting to appeal to the theory of second best. 
The suggestion might be made that because many divergencies 
from pure competition exist in the real world, failure to 
satisfy the conditions for Pareto optimality in the pro­
vision of public goods actually may be desirable. Even the 
attainment of a second best optimum, however, would seem to 
require that individuals reveal their true marginal evalua­
tions. That is, the introduction of nonrevealed preferences 
adds a dimension of indeterminacy that would appear to pre­
vent the attainment, in general, either of a Pareto optimum or 
a second best optimum. The effect of nonrevealed preferences 
on the theory nf sAmnd heef hac little ''ttention, 
but is of sufficient importance to warrant further examina-
100b 
tion; in fact, much additional research is needed on the whole 
question of efficiency in the provision of public goods. 
Until new approaches to this problem are developed, economists 
may have to take consolation from the fact that most democratic 
governments show a high degree of stability, which might be 
viewed as an indication that the provision of most public 
goods is not grossly inefficient. 
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